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AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION
Emily Calhoun*
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I offer a suggestion for making non-discrimina-
tion laws applicable to the workplace more effective. I judge effec-
tiveness both in terms of the influence of non-discrimination laws
on the decision-making behavior of employers and also by their
capacity to provide meaningful legal remedies for contemporary
workplace discrimination. I advocate the use of truthfulness and
the moral imagination to achieve my objective.
I am interested in practical approaches to eliminating discrim-
ination in the workplace. I am a person with a professional back-
ground in civil rights law, as well as administrative experience re-
specting personnel decisions, organizational behavior, and policies
prohibiting workplace discrimination.1 I have a continuing interest
in why, and in what forms, workplace discrimination persists, and
in practical strategies for minimizing that discrimination.
I have found that my practical orientation is strengthened,
rather than compromised or weakened, by relying on strategies as-
sociated with what I call the moral imagination. In making use of
the moral imagination, I am not engaged in a conventional juris-
prudential exercise. Rather, I want to find ways to enlist the vital-
ity of the moral imagination in the practical struggle against work-
* Copyright 1990, Emily Calhoun. All rights reserved.
Professor, University of Colorado School of Law; B.A. 1966, M.A. 1967, Texas Tech
University; J.D. 1971, University of Texas School of Law. I wish to thank the women of the
University of Colorado faculty for their contributions to how I think about discrimination. I
owe special personal and professional thanks to my colleague, Professor Marianne Wesson.
1. Because of my background, my ideas frequently are informed by personal observa-
tion and experience as a civil rights attorney, an employee, and a university administrator. I
am a faculty member of 14 years, have been the subject of department personnel decisions
in two different universities, and have participated as a faculty reviewer in personnel deci-
sions affecting other faculty. I have served as chairperson of a faculty council at a major,
four-campus university system. I have served on a faculty privilege and tenure committee
with jurisdiction over disputes arising out of faculty personnel decisions. As a university
administrative officer from 1986-89, I had responsibility for maintaining general faculty per-
sonnel policies, as well as affirmative action programs, and for administering a review of
salary inequities for women and minority faculty. Thus, a variety of types of informa-
tion-statistical, ethnographic, and anecdotal-is brought to bear in this article.
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place discrimination. I am interested in how an employer's
decisions about women and minorities can be affected when ap-
proached with the moral imagination. I am interested in interpre-
tations of non-discrimination laws that provide meaningful legal
remedies for contemporary forms of workplace discrimination.
Much contemporary workplace discrimination stems from sub-
tle or careless behavior that does not seem to fit within conven-
tional non-discrimination analysis. Once, most persons knew with
certainty what gender or racial discrimination was and why it was
wrongful. It was overt. It was implemented through rules or prac-
tices that directly excluded women and minorities from jobs or op-
portunities. This is no longer true. Contemporary discrimination is
frequently not a byproduct of formal or informal rules applied con-
sistently throughout the workplace.2 Rather, it consists of cumula-
tive, unconscious prejudice or careless conduct of people who seem
to be (and who think of themselves as) "good" people. It is arbi-
trary and unpredictable in its specific manifestations. s
Although there is a strong societal consensus that overt and
patterned forms of discrimination are wrongful, there is no similar
consensus about the wrongfulness of more subtle and unpredict-
able forms of discrimination. For example, when facially neutral
carelessness in the evaluation of merit-carelessness that is intrin-
sic to evaluations of all employees-puts women and minorities at
a greater disadvantage than white males, we do not have a com-
mon language of discrimination with which to discuss the problem.
Women and minorities will have experienced the injustice of care-
lessness, but careless employers and other decision-makers will be
reluctant to characterize themselves as "real" discriminators, those
who consciously and maliciously seek to exclude women and mi-
norities from the workplace. Our current language of discrimina-
tion does not bridge the experiences of women and minorities and
2. See, e.g., N. BENOKRAITIS & J. FEAGIN, MODERN SEXISM: BLATANT, SUBTLE, AND CoV-
ERT DISCRIMINATION chs. 5-6 (1986); B. RESKIN & H. HARTMANN, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S
WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 37-87 (1986); Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1752-53 (1989) (overt sexism and racism has been sup-
planted by far more cruel discrimination carefully masquerading as a judgment on the mer-
its); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Es-
pecially illuminating is B. NENNO, FACULTY SEARCH COMMIrEES AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
POLICY 112-66 (1989) (dissertation on file, University of Colorado Norlin Library), a compre-
hensive account of how attempts to remedy hiring discrimination systemically, without suffi-
cient regard to the role of individuals, run into difficulty.
3. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
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the actions of employers.
I use the moral imagination to respond to this reality of con-
temporary workplace discrimination in a practical and constructive
way. I attempt to provide an alternative to conventional modes of
thinking and talking about discrimination, an alternative that will
influence employer behavior and give judges a more meaningful
tool for responding to discrimination.
The following discussion of workplace discrimination focuses
on individual decisions and decision-makers.' This focus differs
slightly from much contemporary analysis of the problem of dis-
crimination and from conventional wisdom that gives primary
place to group impacts and structural causes of discrimination.'
Structural and group perspectives can, of course, provide impor-
tant insights into the problem of workplace discrimination, and
there are understandable explanations for these analyses. Contem-
porary forms of discrimination frequently make it difficult to pin
down the wrongfulness of individual conduct. Some critics, frus-
trated by the persistence of discrimination that results from un-
conscious prejudice or careless conduct, have argued that, to be ef-
fective, non-discrimination mandates have no alternative but to
shift their focus away from the individual decision-maker.6 Others
have advocated a focus on structures or institution to avoid poten-
tially divisive assertions of personal culpability.7 In many in-
stances, however, these structural and group perspectives provide
insufficient practical guidance to the elimination of workplace
discrimination.
A doctrinal focus on individual decisions and decision-makers
reaffirms an important principle of personal accountability. Princi-
4. See infra section IB (discussing the moral imagination as a methodology of decision-
making).
5. Respecting gender discrimination, see, e.g., the analyses in C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989); Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DuKE L.J. 1207; Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279 (1987).
6. Occasionally, this view may be limited to the proposition that a focus on the individ-
ual decision-maker tends to promote the misleading notion that discrimination is aberra-
tional. E.g., L. TRBmE, AMsRICA CONsTrrTIONAL LAW 1518-21, 1522 n.7 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe
believes that if the "battle against racism is conceived not as an assault on an endemic social
malady, but as culling out of the herd those blameworthy individuals who account for the
remaining, isolated acts of discrimination in an otherwise color-blind society"-i.e., if we
adopt this "fault concept"-non-discrimination mandates will be ineffective. Id.
7. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986); cf. L. TRmE, supra note 6, at
1509 (distinguishing Hunter v. Underwood from other progeny of Washington v. Davis).
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ples of personal accountability that might be enforced through liti-
gation should not be rejected simply because they may cause some
discomfort additional to that inherent in the situation that gives
rise to a lawsuit.8 Instead, non-discrimination mandates should be
interpreted to foster consistent and probative scrutiny of the con-
duct of those individuals whose decisions actually effect discrimi-
nation. At the least, this interpretational effort should be made
before the analytical field is ceded entirely to non-discrimination
doctrines that obscure (and thus weaken) principles of personal ac-
countability and that tend to place the problem of workplace dis-
crimination within the realm of policy, where collective or institu-
tional interests frequently assume primary significance.
Most important, the interpretational effort should be made in
order to preserve an understanding of the wrongfulness of discrim-
ination that will have meaning to ordinary people confronting sub-
tle forms of workplace discrimination. Recently, attempts have
been made to replace highly theoretical and abstract intellectual
analyses of discrimination with concepts that have meaning to or-
dinary individuals. However, these attempts have tended to focus
on the individual victim of discrimination, rather than on the per-
sons whose decisions may lead to discrimination. They have con-
centrated on establishing the perspective of the victim as a valid
and necessary component of legal analysis. The importance of
these analyses must not be underestimated, but they are incom-
plete. They place insufficient emphasis on the person whose
choices effect discrimination. They do not look at the dynamic of
the personal relationship that is at the root of a discriminatory de-
cision. Moreover, they provide no rationale or compelling reason
for decision-makers to adopt the perspective of the individual vic-
tim of discrimination. 10
The moral imagination can remedy current deficiencies in our
8. Reinhold Niebuhr counsels that avoiding divisive allegations of wrongdoing is an ef-
fective political tactic for securing change. See R. NIZBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCI-
r (1932). But when one is speaking of substantive definitions of discrimination that will
affect either prospective employer decisions or the conduct of litigation that usually ensues
only after conflict surfaces and divisiveness is unavoidable, this concern carries little weight.
9. See, e.g., Legal Storytelling (Symposium), 87 MICH. L. Rav. 2073 (1989); Shklar, Giv-
ing Injustice Its Due, 98 YALE L.J. 1135 (1989); Minow, The Supreme Court 1986
Term-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. Rav. 10 (1987); see also, K. BUMILLER,
THE CiviL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988).
10. See, e.g., Legal Storytelling and Minow, supra note 9 (arguments of the narrative
theorists in both sources).
[Vol. 16:137
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understanding of the problem of discrimination, and it can do so
with significant positive effects for women and minorities. It can
suggest substantive definitions that will enable courts to meaning-
fully address subtle, contemporary forms of discrimination. It can
compel persons to make choices in a way that will minimize dis-
crimination. It can help ensure that non-discrimination mandates
directly appeal to (and exploit) every latent moral capacity and
possibility in every individual decision-maker.11 It can have signifi-
cant practical as well as theoretical impact.
In the following pages I describe my conception of the moral
imagination, and suggest how it generally promotes the develop-
ment of meaningful concepts of non-discrimination. 2 I then iden-
tify a principle that has its methodological roots in the moral imag-
ination-the principle of truthfulness-and discuss how that
principle is a forceful vehicle for enhancing the effectiveness of
non-discrimination mandates applicable to the workplace. 13 A com-
mitment to truthfulness is implicit in most personnel systems, but
so far the concept has been largely neglected when the problem of
workplace discrimination is discussed. 14 Because an employer's
failure to meet the obligation of truthfulness will inevitably lead to
discrimination against women and minorities, I propose that a
strong definition of employment discrimination will necessarily in-
corporate the concept of truthfulness. 15 I offer a tentative sugges-
tion for how incorporation might practically strengthen the man-
dates of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as they apply to
discrimination against upper level or professional employees."
I emphasize here two assumptions. First, because truthfulness
is implicit in most personnel systems, employers will have little
theoretical reason to object to, and considerable reason to be com-
fortable with, non-discrimination principles rooted in a commit-
ment to truthfulness. Second, because a failure of truthfulness is
the way in which many women and minorities experience work-
place discrimination, 7 judicial interpretations of non-discrimina-
11. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 8, at xxiv.
12. See infra section I.
13. See infra section IIA.
14. See infra sections IIB, IIC, and III.
15. See infra section III and IVA.
16. See infra section IVB.
17. As a new university administrator, I was surprised when I first encountered a
faculty member who resisted my attempts to translate her concern for truthfulness into the
conventional language of discrimination. Subsequently, I came to expect the reaction and to
1991]
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tion laws that incorporate the principle of truthfulness will be
compatible with the experience of women and minorities. In other
words, truthfulness-a methodology of the moral imagination-can
give us a language of discrimination that will bridge the conduct of
decision-makers and the experience of women and minorities in
the workplace.
I. THE MORAL IMAGINATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION
An understanding of the practical orientation of my argument
requires some acquaintance with the more abstract concept of the
moral imagination. For purposes of this article, I define the moral
imagination in terms of two salient characteristics.18 First, the
moral imagination embodies a way of thinking about, and an atti-
tude toward, individual decisions. It does not presuppose a com-
mitment to a particular set of substantive moral principles. Rather,
it focuses on the individual who must make choices when there are
no substantive principles that clearly dictate the correct choice.
Second, and as a consequence, the moral imagination is interested
in how individual choice is made. It imposes unique methodologi-
cal, rather than substantive, constraints on choice. Because of
these characteristics, the moral imagination is uniquely suited to
developing concepts of discrimination that are meaningful in the
contemporary workplace, where discriminatory conduct is infor-
mal, unpredictable, and subtle, and when there is no agreement as
to its wrongfulness.
adjust my analysis of workplace discrimination accordingly.
18. My ideas have been generally influenced by a variety of discussions of the imagina-
tion and moral reasoning. The most important include: J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION To JURISPRUDENCE (1984); S. HAMPSHIRE. INNOCENCE AND
EXPERIENCE (1989); R. COLES, THE CALL OF STORIES: TEACHING AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION
(1989); M. GREENE, THE DIALECTIc OF FREEDOM (1988); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
(1975); R. NEIBUHR, supra note 8; W. STEVENS, THE NECESSARY ANGEL (1951); Moore, Moral
Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1061. My approach shares the objective and some of the methods
of revitalizing legal standards for decision-making discussed in Burton, Law as Practical
Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (1989).
The term "moral imagination" is not new; for example, Niebuhr uses it. See R.
NIEBUHR, supra note 8, at 257. I wish especially to acknowledge the influence of Coles for his
explication of the importance of the moral imagination to the understanding of, and knowl-
edge about, those who differ from ourselves in small or insignificant ways. Of course, in




A. The Attitude of the Moral Imagination
The moral imagination19 assumes that it can provide valuable
assistance to a person concerned with the rightness or wrongness of
a decision that will affect others. The assistance is valuable de-
spite-or, more accurately, because of-an absence of substantive
principles that clearly dictate individual choice.2 0 For example,
contemporary theorists reject arguments that moral decision-mak-
ing is useless unless there is agreement on a set of substantive, uni-
versal, moral, first principles.21 In a more positive fashion, they
tend to argue that the preservation of .diversity in substantive
moral principles is a positive good, inherently worthwhile and im-
portant.2 They also generally reject arguments that moral deci-
sion-making is futile unless one can say with certainty that a par-
ticular decision is the "right" decision.2 For them, answers
produced through moral decision-making are no less certain than
those typically accepted as valid in the scientific realm.2 4 They
may argue that the decision-making process itself is valid for the
insights-if not the answers-it provides.25 Alternatively, they may
argue that moral decision-making is simply an activity required of
all individuals. 6 Finally, these theorists also reject arguments that
moral decision-making is any less rigorous, any more subjective,
than scientific reasoning: both are heavily dependent on inductive
methodologies, 27 and both are necessarily limited by the uncertain-
ties and subjectivities inherent in ascertaining facts or acquiring
knowledge. 8
19. It is important to understand that the moral imagination does not necessarily bear
an affinity to all moral theories. Moral theorizing encompasses the discussion of substantive
principles that give primary place to individual rights, as well as theories like utilitarianism
that are primarily concerned with collective good. Insofar as the moral imagination is de-
fined as a practical tool for individuals making decisions about other individuals, it has a
greater affinity to the former theories.
20. Cf. Burton, supra note 18, at 789 (practical reasoning assumes indeterminacy).
21. E.g., Moore, supra note 18, at 1106-08.
22. E.g., S. HAaPsHIR, supra note 18 (arguing that diversity in moral principles can be
enhanced by a process of decision-making).
23. Id. In contrast, see the discussion of Ronald Dworkin's position in J. MURPHY & J.
COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 48-52 (although Dworkin promotes a process of decision-mak-
ing, it appears that the end being sought through the process is an answer that is "right").
24. See, e.g., Moore and S. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 18.
25. See, e.g., R UNGER, supra note 18.
26. See, e.g., infra note 52.
27. Moore and S. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 18; see infra section IB.
28. It is important to understand that these persons, e.g., Moore and Hampshire, do
not argue that moral decision-making is worthless in sharing uncertainties and imperfec-
1991] 143
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As a proponent of the importance of the moral imagination, I
accept these arguments and share these attitudes.2" To me, the
value of the moral imagination generally advanced by traditional
arguments is magnified when the moral imagination is brought to
bear on the problem of discrimination.
The intrinsic methodological value of the moral imagination
increases significantly in three situations relevant to discrimina-
tion. The moral imagination is engaged in the art of fine distinc-
tions in individual choice. Thus, it is uniquely suited to case-by-
case decision-making when substantive moral principles cannot or
do not dictate practical, individual choice because either: (1) there
is not a firm consensus regarding abstract, substantive principles of
right and wrong; (2) a particular dilemma calls into question gener-
ally agreed upon substantive principles; or, (3) a particular di-
lemma brings different substantive principles into conflict.
These three situations characterize contemporary discussions
of non-discrimination mandates, especially those that apply to con-
temporary forms of workplace discrimination. As noted earlier,
contemporary forms of discrimination are subtle. Individuals who
make decisions that have adverse consequences for women and mi-
norities are not in agreement as to when these consequences and
subtle influences constitute wrongful discrimination and when they
do not. For example, it is not entirely clear when an employer
must avoid neutral practices that have a disparate impact on mi-
norities and women, and when he must only avoid disparate treat-
ment.30 It is not clear whether the carelessness that leads to ad-
verse consequences for minorities and women is wrongful
discrimination."1 It is not clear when reliance on gender or race in
only a portion of a complex decision-making process is wrongful.
32
tions with scientific reasoning. Compare, C. MAcKINNON, supra notes 3 and 5.
29. I have one additional argument regarding the importance of the methodology of the
moral imagination: moral decision-making is, in certain contexts, an effective agent of
change. See infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text, and infra note 152.
30. Recent Supreme Court decisions have only further confused this issue. See, e.g.,
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). For further discussion of this issue,
see infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
31. Compare the opinions of Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also infra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
32. See, e.g., the conflicting opinions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989). Compare the proposed language of the Civil Rights Act of 1990, S.2104, sec. 4(k)
(February 7, 1990). President Bush vetoed this proposed legislation on October 20, 1990.
Simultaneously, he submitted his own legislative proposal to "cure" what he called the
[Vol. 16:137
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It is not even clear whether explicit reliance on gender or race in
decision-making is wrongful because it is simply irrational,3 a be-
cause it has intolerable consequences for women and minorities,"
because it interferes with expectations,3 5 or because it entails a
qualitative judgment about abilities or roles that is unacceptable
for some other reason. 6 In other words, the rightness and wrong-
ness of conduct that arguably constitutes discrimination is
debatable.
In addition, a practical dilemma calls into question the valid-
ity of absolute non-discrimination mandates in many instances.
For example, the slow and uneven pace of change for women and
minorities in the workplace generates demands for affirmative re-
sponses to the problem of discrimination, demands that seem to be
at odds with the generally approved substantive principle that race
or gender should never be the reason for an employment decision.
3 7
A practical dilemma thus challenges the validity of a prohibition
on discrimination for which there is usually a strong consensus.
Finally, non-discrimination mandates at times seem to require
reconciliation with the substantive principle that qualitative merit
should determine employment opportunity. Non-discrimination
mandates in theory seek to prohibit all forms of discrimination,
including those that are subtle or subconscious.38 However, when
employers are required to take steps to eradicate subtle or uncon-
scious forms of discrimination, important aspects of merit evalua-
"critical defects" of the act as originally proposed. 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
D35.
33. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
34. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1518-21 (discrimination leads to subjugation); D.
KiRP, M. YUDOF, M. FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 29-45 (1986) (discrimination deprives women
of autonomy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (discrimination puts
women in cages, effectively treating them as slaves).
35. See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201
(1979); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987)
(affirmative action cases discussing reverse discrimination); cf. J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN,
supra note 18, at 19-21 (discussing social contract philosophers). It is interesting to note
that this argument does not play a prominent place in judicial discussions of discrimination
against women and minorities, although it is clearly relevant to discrimination in the denial
of opportunity. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (rejecting stereotypes
that assume women have no abilities); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 729-30 (1982) (rejecting stereotypical view that men cannot be good nurses).
37. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616
(1987) (argument that affirmative action plan conflicted with merit principle). Cf. Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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tions are arguably put at risk. 9
The moral imagination is well-suited to helping employers
(whose practical choices will or will not discriminate) and judges
(whose rulings will or will not provide redress for discrimination)
resolve these dilemmas and issues because of its focus on how
choice is made in the absence of substantive principles that dictate
choice.
B. The Methodology of the Moral Imagination
Consistent with the justifications for its role, the moral imagi-
nation's importance to non-discrimination lies in the methodologi-
cal realm. It is premised on forthright acknowledgement that socie-
tal commitment to non-discrimination is confined to quite general
principles that provide little practical guidance to decision-makers.
It does not pretend that traditional non-discrimination mandates
are effective constraints on contemporary forms of discrimination.
The moral imagination tends to favor a concept of discrimination
that is responsive to the critical role of the individual decision-
maker in eliminating discrimination. It tends to favor legal non-
discrimination mandates that embody a methodology of individual
choice.
To appreciate how decision-making behavior and substantive
non-discrimination mandates might be influenced by a methodol-
ogy of individual choice, one needs a more concrete understanding
of the methodology of the moral imagination. Concerned with
choice made in the absence of substantive moral principles that
clearly dictate choice, the methodology is highly inductive. As a
consequence, it insists on self-scrutiny as well as self-
transcendence.
Especially useful discussions of the inductive nature of the
39. This idea is the heart of the argument about the proposed section 4(k) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 which the present administration and other critics argued would have
the effect of requiring employers to engage in "quota" hiring. See supra note 32. This argu-
ment recurs when employers adopt affirmative action measures intended to counteract sub-
tle or unconscious discrimination. See Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977
(1988). It is important to recognize that the argument can arise regardless of how an em-
ployer defines merit. Formal merit concepts can be altered so that activities and experiences
of minorities and women will be deemed worthwhile rather than suspect. See infra note 70
(sources cited therein). Even if this is done, subtle and unconscious forms of discrimination
will not be eliminated without affirmative employer actions. Some will argue that these af-
firmative employer actions threaten the concept of merit as newly defined.
[Vol. 16:137
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moral imagination's methodology, both, of which compare moral
reasoning to scientific reasoning, are Stuart Hampshire's Inno-
cence and Experience,40 and Michael Moore's Moral Reality."'
Taking scientific reasoning as an appropriate norm, both Moore
and Hampshire argue that many scientific truths are indetermi-
nate. These indeterminate truths can be validated only by observa-
tion of particular events that seem to fit within the construct pre-
supposed by the indeterminate truth. In other words, scientific
truths are frequently justified by a process of inductive rather than
deductive reasoning. Moore and Hampshire argue that the meth-
odology of the moral imagination similarly makes use of inductive
reasoning.
Validation of choice through inductive reasoning rather than
through deduction from first principles, in either the scientific or
moral realm, is critically dependent on the integrity of the rea-
soner's observations and thought processes. The scientific reasoner
is at the mercy of imperfect technology and the shortcomings of
prior observers; he also risks letting his own predispositions (or hy-
potheses) color his observations and interpretations. Similarly, the
moral reasoner. must contend with imperfection, uncertainty, and
personal bias.
The moral imagination imposes two special methodological de-
mands on individual choice that are intended to protect the induc-
tive process against its inherent uncertainties, imperfections, and
biases. These are the requirements of self-scrutiny and self-tran-
scendence. I find that these requirements can be best understood
in personal rather than theoretical terms, by briefly considering
what happens when an individual attempts to resolve inner moral
conflict when there is no clearly right or wrong answer.2
Most persons who try to resolve inner moral conflict exert con-
siderable effort to avoid careless or unreflective choice. In order to
40. See S. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 18.
41. See Moore, supra note 18.
42. I am assuming the presence of a person who forthrightly confronts inner dilemma
and conflict, just as I assume that most individuals responsible for interpreting and imple-
menting non-discrimination mandates attempt to resolve real dilemmas in good faith and to
the best of their ability. My suggestions are intended to help them-and others whose
choices will affect the vitality of non-discrimination mandates-bring that good faith to bear
in a way that is invigorated by the moral imagination. Some will undoubtedly argue that the
latter assumption should not pertain, that it is unrealistic and politically naive. If they are
right, and good faith on the part of most judges and employers cannot generally be assumed,
my observations are unimportant.
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avoid careless choice, rigorous scrutiny of one's own perceptions,
motives, and interpretations of the conflict is necessary. In other
words, self-scrutiny is essential. In addition, inner moral conflict
always involves-by definition-at least two contending voices. In
order to avoid careless, unreflective choice, one must ensure that
all contending voices are acknowledged as initially valid, that all
possible resolutions of a dilemma are given due consideration.
Thus, self-transcendence is essential.48 Self-scrutiny looks inward
at one's own motives, biases, perceptions, and interpretations. Self-
transcendence looks outward, at other's perspectives and interpre-
tations. The two activities are mutually reinforcing.
The moral imagination is unrelenting in its methodological in-
sistence on self-scrutiny and self-transcendence by decision-mak-
ers,45 but these demands are not normative. Rather, they are ne-
cessary adjuncts of the type of information considered through the
moral imagination.
When the methodology of the moral imagination is used to de-
termine choice, each possible choice out of a theoretically unlim-
ited set of choices must be assessed in terms of rich, complex, and
broad information. 6 That information may include, for example,
prior experiences, memories, emotions, aspirations, and values;
knowledge of prior events; understanding of personal, social, legal,
historical or political contexts; and, the consequences anticipated
as a result of each possible choice. Self-scrutiny ensures that this
43. To recognize alternative voices and possible resolutions of conflict necessitates an
ability to abstract oneself from one's own way of life. Cf. S. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 18, at 59
(discussing the reasons why some persons eventually recognized slavery as wrongful). This is
the essence of self-transcendence.
44. Cf. S. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 18, at 121 (using the analogy of a compost heap to
explain this aspect of the imaginative reasoning process).
45. These factors also distinguish my argument from other theorists who focus on the
individual in their analysis of discrimination. Compare, e.g., R. COLES, supra note 18, and
the narrative theorists represented in Legal Storytelling, supra note 9. All writers are simi-
larly interested in incorporating the perspectives of others (e.g., of non-majority communi-
ties) into their analysis, but the latter do not talk about self-scrutiny and self-transcen-
dence. They are committed to claiming as valid their own experiences, and not to
challenging others-except indirectly-to scrutinize the validity of their own. In fact their
claims sometimes seem to deny the importance of self-scrutiny and self-transcendence. Cf.
C. MACKINNON, supra notes 3 and 5.
46. An important tenet of much feminist analysis is the proposition that moral deci-
sion-making is enhanced when the context for the decision is expanded. See, e.g., MAPPING
THE MORAL DOMAIN (C. Gilligan, J. Ward, and J. Taylor, eds. 1988); WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY (E. Kittay & D. Meyers, eds. 1987); and M. BELENKY, B. CLINCHY, N. GOLDBERGER,




information has integrity; self-transcendence ensures that the in-
formation encompasses, to the extent possible, the perspective 7 of
persons other than the decision-maker, including those who will be
affected by a particular choice. It helps decision-makers incorpo-
rate values into decision-making while avoiding the human propen-
sity to identify self-interest with universal values.' 8
The methodological demands of self-scrutiny and self-tran-
scendence have obvious practical implications for specific decisions
that affect women and minorities. In the workplace, for example,
self-scrutiny and self-transcendence may serve as a potent antidote
to unconscious prejudice or other subtle forms of discrimination.
Similarly, they may cause a decision-maker to take affirmative
steps to counteract adverse impacts of continued adherence to un-
necessary (albeit traditional) employment practices and criteria
that affect decisions. They may cause a decision-maker to conceive
of decisions in personal terms and to avoid automatically substi-
tuting institutional ethics and collective, group interests for the
ethic that tends to govern person-to-person relationships.49
Contemporary non-discrimination theory frequently dismisses
arguments for moral decision-making as worse than irrelevant or
meaningless, a product of discredited doctrine that diverts atten-
tion from the real causes of discrimination and that advocates an
ethic of powerlessness that perpetuates discrimination. This con-
vention underestimates what happens to a decision-maker sub-
jected to the methodological demands of self-scrutiny and self-
transcendence. The decisions of persons who exercise the moral
imagination will differ significantly from decisions of persons who
do not. 1
47. Perspective is defined broadly here to include values, feelings, aspirations, and all
similar sorts of information.
48. Burton, supra note 18, at 789; R. NIEBUHR, supra note 8, at 250.
49. See infra note 77, for a discussion of how collective interests may-in prac-
tice-obscure individual ethical principles; see J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note 18, at
71, for a discussion of how some moral theories, such as utilitarianism, do the same.
50. E.g., the feminist jurisprudence represented by C. MAcKINNON, supra notes 3 and 5.
I simply do not agree that the moral viewpoint (or an ethic that is concerned with individual
relationships) must be associated with powerlessness. See, e.g., E. PAGELS, ADAM. EvE, AND
THE SERPENT (1989), for an analysis of the Christian ethic that posed a severe threat to
Roman government.
51. The effects, as I describe them, are primarily behavioral rather than psychological,
although it is also possible to argue that the methodology of the moral imagination has
individually transformative effects. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 18; infra notes 46-55 and
accompanying text; and infra note 152.
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The most important practical difference is that self-scrutiny
and self-transcendence will necessarily compel a decision-maker to
fully acknowledge and treat with seriousness the reality, exper-
iences, and interests of all persons (including women and minori-
ties) who will be affected by a particular choice. In other words,
self-scrutiny and self-transcendence will lead to forms of engage-
ment that minimize discrimination.
Decision-making that satisfies the methodological demands of
the moral imagination fosters engagement and connection between
persons whose lives intersect.52 As Hampshire stresses, moral rea-
soning is not argumentative or isolating; it
is the kind of thought that issues in the ability to choose the
right word in a translation of a poem from one language to
another .... It is the kind of thought which good actors un-
dertake in the course of deciding in detail how to play their
parts .... It is the kind of thought which a historian gives to
representing, on the basis of the evidence, the combination of
motives that led the statesman to take his fateful decision.53
Moral reasoning by definition engages individuals actively, at the
most personal level.54 It creates conditions that through self-scru-
52. It is important to emphasize that engagement is a consequence of methodological
demands that derive from the nature of inductive moral reasoning. See supra notes 40-45
and accompanying text. One might also, of course, make a number of traditional normative
arguments that an affected person is entitled to have a decision-maker pursue engagement
through the moral imagination. For example, some might argue that individuals are proper
subjects of moral concern because of a unique status (typically but not always associated
with the capacity to reason and to make moral decisions) that distinguishes human beings
from other living things. Others might assert that the decision-maker must enter the realm
of moral decision-making in order to satisfy an obligation to himself (for example, the obli-
gation to become the most virtuous or complete individual possible). Still others might
avoid obvious philosophical (and logical) difficulties associated with these arguments by pos-
iting, as a descriptive matter of simple fact, that individuals do make choices and derive
satisfaction from asserting some control of their lives through choice. Thus, individuals are
proper subjects of moral concern when the conduct of a decision-maker may affect their
choices or control of their lives. See generally J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note 18, at
37-38 and 75-80.
53. S. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 18, at 47. See generally id. at 38-41. It is important to
note here that justification of decisions reached reflectively may assume an argumentative
form. The justification is, however, only an artifact rather than a faithful, chronological
description of all possibilities and information considered through the moral imagination.
54. The active role played by the moral imagination distinguishes the concept of en-
gagement discussed in this article from the appeal to a decision-maker to accept the per-
spectival validity of women and minorities that characterizes some other discussions of dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 9; and Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1537 (1988)(urging decision-makers to listen-a passive act-to voices from the mar-
gins to insure political freedom).
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tiny promote reflective deliberation and through self-transcen-
dence promote an active search for and serious consideration of the
reality, experiences, and interests of others.
56
Clearly, the engagement fostered by the methodology of the
moral imagination will have consequences for decision-makers that
will minimize discrimination. In addition, the. engagement fostered
by the moral imagination is an objective that judges might reason-
ably seek to achieve through statutory interpretations of non-dis-
crimination mandates.
There is a correspondence between the methodological effects
of the moral imagination and the objectives of non-discrimination
laws that can be illustrated in many ways, but I find one example
particularly telling. A portion of the concurring opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Daniel in Scott v. Sanford's sets forth a particular understand-
ing of the difference between the essential attributes of slaves and
the "character and capacities" of citizens.5 7 The critical difference,
according to Justice Daniel, lies in the capacity to enter into, and
to participate in, relationships. While the term "citizen" is associ-
ated with connection to, and participation in, the larger commu-
nity, a slave can enter into no pacts, can "be no party to, or actor
in, the association of those possessing free will, power, [and] dis-
cretion. s5 The fundamental condition of slavery is, thus, a status
of profound isolation. State-sanctioned slavery not only denies in-
dividual freedoms that can be exercised independently of others, it
also authorizes others to refuse to enter into normal political and
civil relationships with those persons designated as slaves.59 In
55. It is important to understand that the claim of a right to engagement and connec-
tion does not presuppose social cooperation or a need to reach consensus. Cf. J. HABERMAS,
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1981, Eng. tr. 1984). Moreover, it does not entail
reciprocity in a tit-for-tat mode. Cf. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1977). It is more accu-
rately stated simply as a right to conditions that will promote serious and reflective deliber-
ation. The moral imagination places a discussion in a special procedural realm insofar as
individual perspective is concerned. All perspectives are presumed equally valid in the inde-
terminate arena of the moral imagination. The point of view of women and minorities can-
not be dismissed as presumptively biased, merely self-serving, or unworthy of consideration
because it may run counter to another group's expectations or to well-entrenched habits of
conduct. Those whose choices contribute to the problem of discrimination must make deci-
sions that take into account the point of view of others through self-scrutiny and self-
transcendence.
56. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 469-93 (1856) (Daniel, J. concurring).
57. Id. at 475-76.
58. Id. at 477.
59. For a discussion of the importance of isolation to both the wrongfulness and main-
tenance of slavery, see R. FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRAC'I. THE RISE AND FALL OF
AMERICAN SLAVERY 396-400 (1989).
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other words, slavery denies the slave any entitlement to political
engagement.
In the political realm, this feature of discrimination is ad-
dressed through non-discrimination mandates that secure an enti-
tlement to engagement with the broader political community
through rights to vote in primary and general elections, to run for
political office, and to form political associations. These rights help
minorities exert pressure on the larger political community and re-
quire response from that community. They generate demands, for-
mulated from the perspective of the minority community, that
must be taken seriously by others. In other words, they require
engagement. 0
The wrongfulness of discrimination which falls short of slavery
partakes of the same type of isolation from, and lack of engage-
ment with, certain groups. Thus, non-discrimination mandates
that extend beyond the political realm should similarly seek, as a
normative matter, non-isolation and engagement. As in the politi-
cal realm, non-discrimination mandates must seek engagement in-
directly, through procedural devices that create conditions under
which engagement will occur.
The methodological demands of the moral imagination rein-
force this normative objective of non-discrimination mandates.
They encourage the development of non-discrimination mandates
that formally prohibit practices and customs of individual choice
used by decision-makers to isolate minorities and women. For
these reasons, it is worthwhile to seek ways in which self-scrutiny,
self-transcendence, and engagement can be used to formulate sub-
stantive definitions of the types of discrimination that affect indi-
vidual decisions. Such a project is especially important given the
lack of fit between historical concepts of non-discrimination and
contemporary forms of discrimination.
One of Justice O'Connor's decisions implicitly suggests how
methodologies and demands of the moral imagination might be in-
corporated into substantive non-discrimination mandates. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"1 she asserts that one critical object of Ti-
60. For an excellent discussion of the importance of engagement to securing effective
political rights, see Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449 (1988).
61. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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tle VII's non-discrimination mandates is to deter discriminatory
conduct.6 2 She argues that this objective can be achieved by adopt-
ing analytical rules that cause employers to examine and evaluate
their employment practices. 3 Although she shows deference to em-
ployer decisions respecting the "structure of the workplace," she
effectively extends only a qualified privilege to employers, a privi-
lege conditioned on a certain degree of self-scrutiny."e Her appar-
ent, practical concern is avoiding careless and unconsciously
prejudiced decisions."
The remainder of this article pursues the suggestion embodied
in O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence,6 6 and provides an
extended example of how substantive non-discrimination man-
dates are strengthened when they incorporate the methodologies
and attitudes of the moral imagination. The use of this example
limits discussion to non-discrimination mandates in merit-based
personnel systems affecting professional and upper-level
employees.
II. TRUTHFULNESS, THE MORAL IMAGINATION, AND
MERIT-BASED PERSONNEL SYSTEMS
0 7
A. Truthfulness and the Moral Imagination
Truthfulness is a principle that can infuse conventional non-
62. Id. at 264-65.
63. Id. at 270-79.
64. Id.
65. The significance of her analysis stands out when it is contrasted with Justice Ken-
nedy's dissenting opinion. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279-95 (1990). Ken-
nedy neither discusses a deterrence objective for Title VII, id. at 289-90, nor accepts the
derivative principle that employer carelessness or failure to engage in self-scrutiny consti-
tutes grounds for Title VII liability. Id. at 293-95. As a result, he rejects the majority (and
O'Connor's) analytical framework in mixed motive cases.
66. The suggestion appears elsewhere, as well. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)(prospect of backpay awards provides incentive to employers to
"self-examine" and "self-evaluate" practices); cf. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 652 nn. 35 & 36 (1980)(liability will increase incentives to guard against indifference
and interactive group behavior that may lead to unconstitutional conduct).
67. Illuminating discussions of merit-based personnel systems and Title VII, especially
in contrast to the approach taken herein, include: Bartholet, Jobs in High Places, 95 HAav.
L. REv. 947 (1982); and, Fallon, To Each According to His Ability, From None According to
His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of Anti-Discrimination, 60 B.U.L. REv. 815
(1980). These two authors explore the concept of merit from different viewpoints-practical
and philosophical, respectively-yet both look predominantly at criteria rather than
processes for determining merit. Bartholet argues that her analysis is suitable for identifying
discriminatory decision-making systems; however, her concept of what constitutes a system
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discrimination concepts with moral imagination. As an ethical
tenet, it is included in many moral systems."8 In functional terms,
truthfulness is a practice that may be used to derive "true" state-
ments about particular matters, including those not open to abso-
lute verification.
Essential traits of truthfulness correspond to distinguishing
features of the moral imagination. Truthfulness is a guarantor of
impartiality, which I define to be open-mindedness and lack of
bias.ee It has, therefore, a necessary methodological affinity to the
moral imagination. As with truthfulness, moral imagination de-
mands self-scrutiny and self-transcendence in order to eliminate
personal bias and to ensure that decision-makers reflectively en-
gage with a rich and varied-rather than a limited or incom-
plete-set of data. Truthfulness demands rigorous standards of re-
liability and integrity in data collection and assessment. It
demands accuracy and impartiality in both subsidiary judgments
and the discrete facts upon which rest ultimate judgments or state-
ments of truth. As the moral imagination, truthfulness frequently
enhances itself by expanding the context within which judgments
are made. It promotes active rather than passive conduct, which
leads to engagement.
Truthfulness is, therefore, a natural vehicle for implementing
the moral imagination in decision-making. Moreover, because
women and minorities frequently experience discrimination as a
failure of truthfulness, and because the principle (if not always the
practice) of truthfulness is essential to the operation of merit-
based personnel systems that may foster and contribute to work-
place discrimination, it is an obvious focal point for a discussion of
is quite limited. Bartholet, supra, at 973-88.
68. See, e.g., 7-8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 150-51 (1972). As Niebuhr states, in in-
dividual relationships, truthfulness "[is part of] ... the working capital of personal moral-
ity." R. NIEBUHR, supra note 8, at 174. For my understanding of truthfulness, I rely most
heavily on S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1979) [hereinafter
LYING]. Not only has Bok provided an exceptionally illuminating study of truthfulness as a
moral concept, she has also demonstrated that it is not unduly difficult to give the concept
practical meaning. Her discussion of practices of deceit, id. at 64, has obviously influenced
my discussion of the practice of truthfulness. See infra notes 129-146 and accompanying
text.
69. Personal bias frequently represents a special failure of truthfulness, i.e., a failure of
truthfulness to oneself, or the avoidance of self-deception. On the corrupting effects of self-
deception, and its impact on duties owed to others and responsibility for decisions, see, e.g.,
M. MARTIN, SELF-DECEPTION AND MOEALIrrY 39 and 55 (1986); and S. Bok, SECRETS: ON THE
ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 59-72 (1983).
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how the moral imagination can be used to strengthen non-discrimi-
nation mandates.
B. Truthfulness as Principle in Merit-Based Personnel
Systems
A commitment to the more obvious methodological principles
of truthfulness is implicit in commonly used merit-based personnel
systems. In merit evaluations, the employer seeks an ultimate
judgment about individual merit that he can claim to be true.
70
What is true is not envisioned as an absolute. Rather, truth is rela-
tive to an employer's evaluation criteria: the "truth" about an em-
ployee's merit is reflected in the fit between that employee's quali-
fications or accomplishments and the generic, ideal employee
envisioned by an employer's evaluation criteria. Depending on the
degree of correspondence or fit, an employee may be described "in
truth," for example, as satisfactory or exceptional.
Employers have no way of definitively testing whether their
ultimate judgments of merit are valid at the time such judgments
are made. For example, it is rare that ultimate judgments in post-
hiring evaluations are entirely retrospective. Even salary adjust-
ments-typically viewed as rewards for past performance- may
be based on assessments of prospective contributions."' An em-
ployer might reliably test the truth of an ultimate judgment of po-
tential contributions by determining at some future date whether
the judgment did, in fact, accurately predict performance. Such a
test is, by definition, impossible to apply at the time the ultimate
judgment is made. Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to apply the
test to a negative evaluation of merit, as negative judgments tend
to exclude individuals from the very work environment in which
70. Bartholet challenges, as do other commentators, the assumption that employers are
really interested in merit. Bartholet, supra note 67, at 957, 991-96; see also Kennedy, A
Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L. J. 705;
Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382
(1989); Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work: Challenging Gender Biases
in The Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE L.J. 1397 (1988). Employer disinterest in merit
may exist, especially on an unconscious level, and, therefore, the actual results of personnel
decisions may be hard to reconcile with merit. At the theoretical, explicit, and conscious
level, however, most employers are committed to the use of merit systems. The disjunctures
among conscious commitment, individual behavior, and actual results are the focus of this
article.
71. Employers tend to have a longitudinal perspective in their evaluations. See, e.g., R.
LSTER, REASONING ABOUT DISCRIMINATION: ANALYSIS OF PROFESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE WORK
IN FEDERAL ANTIBIAS PROGRAMS (1980).
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future performance might be judged. 2
For this reason, an employer committed to a merit-based per-
sonnel system must also be committed to integrity and accuracy in
data collection and assessment. The maintenance of integrity and
accuracy in data collection and assessment is the only hope of an
employer who wishes to attain a sufficient degree of certainty in a
positive ultimate judgment to warrant reliance on the expectation
that a favorable prediction will be fulfilled. This is also true where
the employer desires a sufficient degree of certainty in negative
judgments to ensure that a worthy employee will be neither mis-
takenly overlooked nor rejected.
Employers concerned about the truth of an employee's merit
will necessarily tolerate a degree of uncertainty in broad, ultimate
judgments. They will make a pragmatist's compromise with the
principle of truth. They will be less willing to compromise truthful-
ness. For example, they will demand accuracy in the statement of
discrete, subsidiary facts. They may also demand a substantial de-
gree of certainty in subsidiary judgments about particular aspects
of a career because such judgments can be more closely tied to fact
than can ultimate judgments about overall merit. They will adhere
to methodologies and review processes that ensure the truthfulness
of persons who supply information used in judging an individual's
merit.
C. Truthfulness in Practice in Merit-Based Personnel Systems
Although a commitment to the methodological principles of
truthfulness is implicit in merit-based personnel systems, the prin-
ciples are frequently neglected in practice. Moreover, there is no
apparent recognition of the relationship between adherence to
these principles, the type of information typically considered in
merit reviews, the need for self-scrutiny and self-transcendence,
and the objective of engagement.
Academic merit reviews provide a good illustration of the dis-
crepancy between commitment in principle and practice." Theo-
72. Negative evaluations that prevent an employee from assuming new, expanded job
responsibilities exclude the employee from the work environment in which he or she might
be able to establish individual ability. Some evaluations, however, such as those undertaken
in universities, may not affect job responsibilities.
73. A number of informative descriptions of academic review processes are available. In
this section, I rely throughout on R. LEsma, supra note 71; G. LANouE & B. LEE, AcADEMIcs
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retically, academic merit reviews are based upon an avowed com-
mitment to the value of truthfulness, a value directly tied to the
notion of academic freedom.7' However, in practice, the value of
truthfulness does not have a significant impact on the choice of
methodologies used to evaluate faculty. Academic research meth-
odologies used to collect and assess data must meet accepted stan-
dards of reliability and integrity. Research is deemed meritorious
only if there is a strong correspondence between data and conclu-
IN COURT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF FACULTY DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION (1987); Tobias, En-
gendering Law Faculties, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143 (1990); Radford, Sex Stereotyping and
the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 471 (1990); Angel,
Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or The
Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799 (1988); Biernat, Subjective Criteria
in Faculty Employment Decisions Under Title VII: A Camouflage for Discrimination and
Sexual Harassment, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 501 (1987); Kluger, Sex Discrimination in the
Tenure System at American Colleges and Universities: The Judicial Response, 15 J. LAW
& EDUC. 319 (1986); Zirkel, Personality as a Criterion for Faculty Tenure: The Enemy It Is
Us, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 223 (1984); Cooper, Title VII in the Academy: Barriers to Equality
for Faculty Women, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 975 (1983); Divine, Women in the Academy: Sex
Discrimination in University Faculty Hiring and Promotion, 5 J. LAW & EDUC. 429 (1976);
B. NENNO, supra note 2; and, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS (1984). When I be-
lieve that aspects of review processes have special interest, I reference specific illustrations
from the preceding works. Nenno is an especially good source of specific illustrations be-
cause she studies decision-making processes that have not resulted in litigation and can
therefore be seen as normal rather than aberrant. See also Bell, supra note 70; and, Del-
gado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2411 (1989).
Academic reviews closely resemble reviews that affect career advancement in
other-especially professional-work environments. For one comparison, see, R. LESTER,
supra note 71. Lester discusses the characteristics of personnel evaluations of upper level
employees in three different work environments: the university, the federal civil service, and
business. He argues that the work environments are sufficiently different from each other,
and from conventional blue collar, entry-level positions, that uniform non-discrimination
guidelines cannot be applied to them. But Lester's conclusion is based on conventional in-
terpretations of Title VII. The perspective of truthfulness employed herein sees more simi-
larity than dissimilarity in the work environments described by Lester. The similarities in-
here in the individualistic nature of jobs and job performance, the longitudinal view brought
to bear on all performance reviews, and employer reliance on peer and group evaluation.
Thus, many of the observations made herein will apply to reviews in other work
environments.
74. Because personnel evaluations represent judgments about the academic merit of in-
dividuals and their teaching or research projects, they are considered an exercise of an
evaluator's academic freedom. A professed commitment to truth and truthfulness is the
quid pro quo for faculty autonomy from non-academic, institutional interests-such as ten-
ure quotas-that might otherwise dominate the personnel decision-making process. See,
e.g., Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.
J. 251 (1989) (arguing that the university is premised on agreement that knowledge and
understanding are pursued with detachment or disinterestedness; that a disinterested search
for knowledge fosters, at its best, careful and critical discourse). Preserving these values is at
the heart of academic freedom. Id. at 333-38.
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sions. If data are incomplete or uncertain, or if the research meth-
odology does not comport with accepted standards, the research is
not considered "truly" meritorious or academically valuable. The




There are a number of methodological differences between
evaluations of research and academic personnel.76 I focus on two
methodological traits that one would expect to find in merit re-
views that adhere to the principle of truthfulness: (1) specification
of criteria that determine inclusion and exclusion of relevant infor-
mation; and (2) methodologies for gathering reliable, complete, and
unbiased data respecting the criteria. These traits are given short
shrift in academic personnel reviews. 7
75. See, e.g., the sources cited supra note 73, in particular, G. LANOuE & B. LEE, supra
note 73, at 21, who characterize faculty reviews as lacking peer accountability. See also the
specific case studies of hiring reviews contained in B. NENNO, supra note 2. This might not
be a significant problem were the outcome of an individual's review dependent solely on the
merit of prior scholarly research. But reviews take into account other types of accomplish-
ments, such as teaching and service, as well as considerations of potential contributions. See
infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
76. For example, although it is acknowledged that secrecy jeopardizes research integ-
rity, it has traditionally been permitted to play a significant role in the evaluation of faculty.
For a discussion of secrecy and norms of scientific research, see S. BOK, SECRETS, supra note
69, at 153-170. For a discussion of secrecy in the context of academic peer reviews, see
Brooks, Confidentiality of Tenure Review and Discovery of Peer Review Materials, 1988
B.Y.U. L. REV. 705; Gregory, Secrecy in University and College Tenure Decisions: Placing
Appropriate Limits on Academic Freedom, 16 U..C. DAvis L. Rev. 1023 (1983); and Com-
ment, The Burden of Proof and Academic Freedom: Protection for Institution or Individ-
ual, 82 Nw. U.L. Rav. 492 (1988).
The Supreme Court has demanded disclosure of materials that will indirectly affect the
tradition of secrecy in academic merit reviews-at least in the context of litigation arising
out of complaints of discrimination in academic personnel evaluations. See University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
77. The impact of these deficiencies is exacerbated by the fact that academic reviews
are performed by a group rather than an individual. Merit reviews are performed by faculty
peers who collectively express a final judgment of merit through either a favorable or an
unfavorable vote. Group behavior may differ significantly from individual behavior. See gen-
erally R. NIEBUHR, supra note 8, and S. BOK, LYING, supra note 68, at Chapter XI. Group
interests unrelated to academic merit may affect the review process itself or color an evalu-
ator's assessment of individual qualifications. For example, collegiality may become as im-
portant a value as-or even operate at the expense of-truthfulness. A woman's insistence
on non-discrimination may be viewed as uncollegial or disruptive. See, e.g., G. LANouE & B.
LEE, supra note 73, at 58-59 and the sources cited infra note 79. Although an evaluator may
believe information on a particular candidate is incomplete, collegial deference to those who
gathered the information, a desire to avoid a hint of criticism that might be interpreted as a
challenge to peer credibility, or fear of internal dissension may prevent a challenge to the
information. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
In addition, a desire to maintain a certain group status may influence conduct. There
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1. Criteria for Inclusion and Exclusion of Relevant
Information
No serious scholar would undertake research to determine the
truth of a particular hypothesis without first ascertaining the pre-
vailing criteria for assessing truth within the relevant discipline.
Such criteria set the boundaries for collecting data in a way that
members of the discipline deem to be legitimate. They provide a
benchmark for the assessment of research validity. In academic re-
views, there is a consensus that the issue to be proved (or dis-
proved) 78 is merit, and that teaching, service, and research are the
relevant merit criteria.7 9 Historically, however, universities have
not provided more specific guidance to assist evaluators in deter-
mining merit.80 Moreover, it is difficult to derive a specific, sub-
stantive import for a particular university's notion of merit from
prior reviews. An academic department makes promotion and ten-
ure decisions relatively infrequently; therefore, even informal
may be, for example, an unstated concern that promoting a woman will diminish the status
and salary level of others in a particular department. Confidential conversation, University
of Colorado faculty member and author, Fall, 1987. See also J. JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS:
SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS 155 (1989); G. LANoUE & B. LEE, supra note 73, at
180-82, 213 (illustrating departmental concern with status and reputation). Finally, al-
though a woman is well qualified for a job, she might be rejected because an employer fears
her hiring will cause disruption among otherwise productive male workers. Cf. T. SOWELL,
CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 24 (1984).
78. A research project really entails a search for evidence that will disprove a hypothe-
sis since, except in mathematics or logic, affirmative proof of truth is impossible to achieve.
H. PAGELS, THE DREAMS OF REASON 250-51 (1989). This feature of evaluations of merit has
special significance because women and minorities typically enter a merit review without
some of the presumptions of merit accorded other persons. See infra notes 95-101 and ac-
companying text.
79. Factors other than merit in teaching, research, and service may be used by upper-
level administrators who must decide whether to ratify department salary, promotion, or
tenure recommendations. For example, although departments are not typically concerned
with long-term budgetary implications of tenure decisions, upper-level administrators may
take high tenure ratios into account in their own decisions. This article uses department
decisions as a model because they are theoretically untainted by such considerations.
Collegiality is also an important factor in decisions, even at the department level. In
addition to the sources cited supra note 77, see Tobias, supra note 73, at 1148-50; Rhode,
Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1187-92 (1988); Angel, supra
note 73 at 830; Zirkel, supra note 73, at 235-37; Brooks, supra note 76, at 709-10; and, B.
NENNO, supra note 2, at 82, and 126-28. As these sources show, a concern for collegiality
may result in consideration of matters that adversely affect women and minorities, or may
arguably give rise to a distinct Title VII claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, which prohibits
retaliation against persons who oppose practices made illegal by Title VII. See generally, M.
PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 270 (1988).
80. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 73 at 1150-52; Angel, supra note 73, at 830; and Zirkel,
supra note 73, at 225-26.
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standardization of criteria does not always occur. Even department
faculty may have only an attenuated sense of comparative history
or precedent in evaluations. Precedential ambiguity is exacerbated
by two factors: the membership of review committees may change
from year to year, and collective judgments are necessarily the
product of differing mixes of motives, rationales, and discrete judg-
ments.8" Not only is it difficult to identify what criteria were actu-
ally dispositive of prior group decisions, it is almost impossible to
determine whether individual evaluators used the same (or as-
signed the same weight to) merit criteria.82
An absence of clear and certain criteria for conducting an in-
quiry is a special problem when the ultimate issue to be deter-
mined is open-ended, as is merit, and to which a wide range of
information is potentially relevant. It bears repeating that truth-
fulness is a practice used to derive a statement of truth about a
particular matter. Truthfulness is truthfulness about a specific is-
sue. If an evaluator does not know precisely what issue he must be
truthful about, his truthfulness will be compromised. For example,
he will not know when a particular statement or set of information
must be made more complete if he is to be truthful about the issue
at hand. Alternatively, he will not know which bits of information
must, because they are central to the issue, be rigorously scruti-
nized for accuracy and bias. In other words, criteria (or their ab-
sence) affect the processes and methodologies of truthfulness in
critical ways.
2. The Integrity, Comprehensiveness, and Reliability of Data
In academic merit reviews, there is no reason to assume that
data bearing on the merit of individual faculty will have integrity,
will be comprehensive, or will inevitably be demanded as justifica-
tion for subjective assessments of merit. Informal information-
gathering combines with the absence of clear merit criteria to com-
promise the integrity of information necessary to truthfulness.
81. There is no requirement that any given individual provide a justification for his or
her vote. There is, therefore, almost no reliable way to explain the basis for a prior group
decision. Explications of the vote may consist of reconstructions of faculty discussions, or
inferences drawn from comments offered during the give and take of discussion. These may
or may not accurately reflect individual judgments.
82. See, e.g., B. NENNO, supra note 2 (illustrating throughout how different criteria are
important to different members of review committees).
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As the previous discussion suggests, an absence of clear and
certain merit criteria is part of the problem. In addition, faculty
reviews generally occur over a period of months or years during
which evaluators informally acquire information (for example,
through daily interaction with the candidate or with the candi-
date's mentor). 8  In extended academic reviews, information-gath-
ering and preliminary judgments are frequently the product of a
"panoply of brief acts of attending and ignoring that form the
warp and woof of [the] everyday consciousness."" They tend to be
spontaneous events given no more conscious attention than other
routine, daily acts of habit.85 Unless a university has a careful, sup-
plemental system for actively gathering information over time, and
testing judgments as they develop, opinions and information intro-
duced into the formal decision process will likely be unreliable, in-
complete, or even inaccurate. 86
83. There are established times at which actual salary, promotion, or tenure decisions
are made, but during the years preceding a review, colleagues form many subsidiary opin-
ions about particular aspects of a candidate's work, and even about the general worthiness
of a candidate. See, e.g., Angel, supra note 73, at 831 (commenting on the fact that evalua-
tion begins the moment a candidate walks in the door); Zirkel, supra note 73, at 224-25. A
candidate, therefore, enters the actual decision process as the subject of various, more or
less well-formed, individual hypotheses of merit. Group decision-making frequently consists
of an undertaking to verify (or refute) these hypotheses. Verification or refutation of a par-
ticular hypothesis may take precedence over an attempt to ascertain whether a candidate
measures up to the complete ideal described by stated merit criteria. If a particular hypoth-
esis about a candidate fails to include assumptions relevant to all merit criteria, then evalu-
ators may overlook accomplishments or qualifications that have been considered relevant in
other reviews. Moreover, truthfulness is compromised by data that are incomplete relative
to the employer's concept of merit.
I have not chosen to dwell on the ways in which extended reviews are influenced by
whether, over time, opportunities to show merit are given to employees, but the importance
of this aspect of extended reviews must be mentioned. If, for example, women are not asked
to work on particular projects-are not asked to assume particular responsibilities-they are
not given an opportunity to establish merit in the incremental ways that may influence
ultimate judgments of merit at the time the formal decision-making process occurs. Subsidi-
ary judgments formed over time are dependent on the opportunities which a person has
been given to show merit. A university may have formal programs that give faculty opportu-
nities to enhance their experience and reputation, but opportunities are much more likely to
be the product of informal collegial interaction. Thus, daily opportunity-even opportunity
which might in isolation seem minor-significantly influences the formulation of subsidiary
and ultimate judgments critical to career advancement. See generally R. KANrER, MEN AND
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
84. M. MARTIN, supra note 69, at 83.
85. The informal methods of gathering personal information over time for academic
reviews might even be characterized as "gossip." Cf. S. BOK, SECRETS, supra note 69, at 89-
101; see also B. NENNO, supra note 2, at 112-31 and 155-56.
86. Formal systems for gathering information and testing judgments over time do not
exist in most universities. Faculty tend to resist on-going administrative scrutiny of their
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Truthfulness is clearly compromised under these conditions. It
is further at risk because unscrutinized opinion plays a critical role
in reviews that occur over time.
The difficulty is not opinion per se,8 7 but unscrutinized opin-
ion. Opinion tends not to be scrutinized for two different reasons.
First, for reasons discussed previously, a peer evaluator's credibil-
ity, rather than closely examined facts, frequently serves as war-
rant for the integrity of a particular opinion, and for the truth of a
judgment of merit.88 Because disagreement with peer opinion re-
specting merit may be construed in personal terms as an assault on
an evaluator's credibility or integrity, the discussion of another's
merit puts at risk the collegiality of relationships among evalu-
ators.89 As a result, there is a built-in disincentive for faculty to
scrutinize the validity of peer opinion. Second, because of the
methodological deficiencies of academic reviews, there is frequently
insufficient information against which opinion could be tested,
even were a peer inclined to do so. Thus, opinion is not scrutinized.
There is not a strong warrant for the integrity, impartiality, or ac-
curacy-i.e., for the truthfulness-of the review.
Academic reviews are not unlike other merit reviews in the ex-
istence of a marked discrepancy between the commitment to meth-
odological principles of truthfulness and actual practices of truth-
fulness. They are also not unlike other merit reviews in apparently
ignoring the connection between methodologies of truthfulness,
self-scrutiny, self-transcendence, and engagement. In my opinion,
practical disregard for truthfulness is closely connected to the per-
sistence of workplace discrimination. In the section that follows, I
academic work. Moreover, there is no academic tradition of methodological constraints on
how, over time, peers gather comprehensive and reliable data about individual faculty.
87. Reliance on opinion can present difficulties. Consider, for example, a university re-
view policy that equates merit with reputation. By definition, reputation is mere opinion.
Thus, its validity is not beyond question, although evaluators may be tempted to take it at
face value or to use it as an easily obtainable surrogate for hard data.
88. For example, the endorsement of a respected senior faculty mentor may outweigh
other types of information. The academic standing of scholars reviewing published work (or
of students evaluating teaching) may count as much as the existence of facts that support
the opinion. See, e.g., B. NENNO, supra note 2, at 155-57 (discussion is influenced by opin-
ions of certain individuals whose credibility is given deference, to the exclusion of considera-
tion of objective facts); R. KANTER, supra note' 83, at 181-84 (identifying the associational
stature provided by mentors as one of four key functions that mentors serve in promoting a
junior employee's career advancement); and, Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place, Stere-
otyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. Rav. 345, 353 n.40
(1980). On mentoring, generally, see infra note 92.
89. See supra notes 77 and 79.
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discuss why workplace discrimination inevitably flows from a disre-
gard of truthfulness. To illustrate the point, I focus on gender dis-
crimination in universities, although the argument applies equally
well to racial discrimination and to discrimination in other
environments.
III. THE LINK BETWEEN DISREGARD FOR PRACTICES OF
TRUTHFULNESS AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION
The demographics of the contemporary workplace" are such
that the absence of truthfulness inevitably translates into the pres-
ence of a gender-based preference. 1 The preference affects both
the opportunity to have merit assessed and the final assessment of
merit itself. Its effect on opportunity is central to my discussion of
workplace discrimination. Discrimination against women in their
attempts to establish merit will predictably flow from a disregard
of methodologies of truthfulness. A good illustration is provided by
academic reviews and the way in which gender stereotypes affect
90. Although women certainly have achieved gains in the workplace, and some forms of
discrimination have been effectively eliminated, career progress continues to be slow and
uneven. See, e.g., Angel, supra note 73, at 804-05, 828-30, 834-35 (for statistics on the ad-
vancement of women in professional employment). According to recent reports of the Amer-
ican Association of University Professors, Annual Report on the Economic Status of the
Profession, Academe (March-April 1989) [hereinafter Annual Report], and the AAUP's
Committee W, Academic Women and Salary Differentials, Academe (July-Aug. 1988) [here-
inafter Committee W Report], women constitute 26.4 percent of all full-time faculty in the
four primary categories of institutions of higher education. Annual Report, supra, at 19,
Table 14 (statistics exclude only those 2-year institutions that do not assign rank to faculty).
While 71 percent of male faculty are tenured, only 49 percent of women enjoy this status.
Committee W Report, supra, at 15, Table 9. The figures for doctoral level institutions are 73
percent and 46 percent, respectively. Id. In the four primary categories of institutions of
higher education, women comprise only 12.3 percent of full professors, 25 percent of associ-
ate professors, and 38 percent of assistant professors. Id. at 19, Table 14. The comparable
figures for doctoral level institutions are 8.6 percent, 21.6 percent, and 33.9 percent, respec-
tively. Id. The percentages for all combined institutions have apparently changed only
slightly since 1983, when the corresponding figures were 10 percent, 20 percent, and 35 per-
cent, respectively. H. BOWEN & J. SCHusTER, AMERICAN PROFESSORS, A NATIONAL RESOURCE
IMPERILED 56 (1986). Between 1975 and 1988, in almost every faculty rank, salary differences
between gender groups-which may be, but are not necessarily, dependent on rank and ten-
ure status-increasingly disadvantaged women. Committee W Report, supra. The pace of
career advancement for women in academia is not atypical. See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note
77; Hartmann, Internal Labor Markets and Gender: A Case Study of Promotion, in GEN-
DER IN THE WORKPLACE (C. Brown and J. Pechman, eds. 1987); Rhode, supra note 5, at
1208-11; Note, 97 YALE L. J. 1397 (1988); N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, sec. A, at 1, col. 1;
Hymowitz & Schellhardt, The Glass Ceiling, Wall St. J., March 24, 1986, sec. 4, at 1, col. 1.
91. See, e.g., C. MAcKINNON, supra notes 3 and 5; and, Minow, supra note 9, at 74, who
discuss how neglect of women's perspectives inevitably leads to discrimination.
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those reviews.
Stereotypes are a crude, verbal form of probabilistic reasoning
about particular individuals. There is much recent scholarship that
convincingly demonstrates the prevalence of, and harm caused by,
gender stereotypes in any merit review.92 Gender stereotypes are
overwhelmingly negative as they apply to women in professional
92. See, e.g., N. BENOKRArrIS & J. FEAGIN, supra note 2; R. KANTER, supra note 83, at
230-37; Rhode, supra note 5, at 1219-22; Rhode, supra note 79, at 1187-92; Radford, supra
note 73; Cooper, supra note 73; Zirkel, supra note 73; Taub, supra note 88; Note, Permissi-
ble Sexual Stereotyping versus Impermissible Sexual Stereotyping: A Theory of Causa-
tion, 34 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL L. REv. 679 (1989); and B. SANDLER, Assoc. OF AM. COLLEGES, THE
CAMPUS CLIMATE REVISITED: CHILLY FOR WOMEN FACULTY, ADMINISTRATORS, AND GRADUATE
STUDENTS (1986); cf. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). I do not consider stereotypes the only
subtle cause of contemporary discrimination in merit reviews that can be linked to truthful-
ness. I treat stereotyping as a serious methodological problem, one of many, that has a sig-
nificant, deleterious effect on practices of truthfulness. Stereotypes are, of course, morally
reprehensible as well as methodologically invalid. For example, historically, statistics were
used to describe racial types or a more general "homme type," from which individual varia-
tions were considered error. The history of, and moral issues raised by, these academic theo-
ries are discussed in T. PORTER, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL THINKING, 1820-1900 at 106, 108,
140, and 164 (1986).
One other practice that is linked to truthfulness and creates difficulties for women and
minorities is worth special mention. Mentors are especially important to the informal pro-
cess of information gathering, and to the existence of favorable opinion respecting merit.
See, e.g., R. KANTER, supra note 83, at 181-84 (on the importance of sponsors in corpora-
tions). According to Kanter, sponsors have a number of roles: they coach junior employees
on getting along and advancing within the system, they advocate for the junior employee,
they help junior employees bypass obstacles in the corporate hierarchy, and they signal to
other people that the junior employee is a person to be reckoned with. Their professional
reputations lend stature to that of the junior faculty member. Their credibility and reputa-
tion are the warrant for favorable opinions of academic work. Mentors may provide invalua-
ble feedback to junior faculty regarding how the merit of their activities is perceived by
others. This feedback can have a significant impact on a merit evaluation that occurs over
time. See, e.g., G. LANotE & B. LEE, supra note 73, at 53, 83 (lack of general feedback), 105
(failure to counsel plaintiff regarding the need for a master's degree); N. BENOKRAITIS & J.
FRAGIN, supra note 2, at 67. Finally, the interaction fostered by mentors may help other
evaluators transcend the irrelevant differences and assumptions embodied in stereotypes.
Interaction contributes to a "working capital" of personal morality-trust and concern for
truth as seen from several perspectives-that helps minimize the likelihood that "truth" will
not be discerned. R. NIEUHR, supra note 8, at 173-74; cf. Legal Storytelling, supra note 9.
For a variety of reasons, junior women faculty apparently do not have the kind of relation-
ships with professional mentors that junior male faculty enjoy. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note
73, at 1149 n. 32. Not only are there few available mentors of their gender, but women may
actually be affirmatively excluded from collegial interaction with senior male colleagues.
See, e.g., B. SANDLER, supra note 92; N. BENOKRAIrIS & J. FEAGIN, supra note 2, at 91-95.
Women may also be wary of mentorships because of the way in which they are occasionally
abused. Id. at 103-104. Studies consistently show that women have difficulty becoming part
of an informal work world that is predominantly male. See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 77, at
154.
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(or academic) jobs." Negative stereotypes of, and assumptions
about, women will operate in disadvantageous tandem with stereo-
types that tend to favor men.9' They result in cumulative judg-
ments that, in extended reviews, may become well entrenched long
before formal assessment of merit is undertaken.
Explicit reliance on an identifiable, substantive stereotype is
acknowledged as discriminatory."' But stereotypes exert their most
important influence in much more subtle and powerful ways when
review methodologies disregard the principle of truthfulness.
Stereotypes put women at a procedural disadvantage in the review
process.
In order to understand the procedural disadvantage, consider
again the key methodological features of academic reviews: poorly
understood or shifting merit criteria, a dearth of consistent and
hard information respecting merit, and heavy reliance on peer
opinion. Under these conditions, an evaluator has no choice but to
grapple with uncertainty. Each time an evaluator decides whether
to give the review subject the benefit of the doubt on a less than
clear matter, or whether to insist on a careful inquiry into matters
that may have been overlooked by others, the evaluator's personal
standards of certainty influence his decision.
Evaluators' standards of certainty are affected by gender simi-
larity or dissimilarity." This is a likely explanation for the opera-
tion of an especially insidious procedural stereotype that views
women to be a higher risk than men. A stereotype, which I refer to
93. All of the works cited immediately above give specific illustrations of the over-
whelmingly negative import of gender stereotypes. See supra note 92. There are some ex-
ceptions to the disadvantages that gender stereotypes usually have on women's employment
opportunities. See, e.g., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
94. This may especially be the case when continued lack of representation of women
among evaluators gives men an overwhelming influence upon the evaluation. See, e.g., R.
KANTER, supra note 83. Kanter argues that the treatment of particular people within an
organization is a direct consequence of their numbers. Id. at 207-41. Tokens tend to stand
out, to get more attention than their peers, to be more easily stereotyped in terms of group
characteristics, and to have exaggerated importance placed upon their differences from
peers of the opposite gender. See generally supra note 92. For a description of a court that
took the numerical dominance of male evaluators into account in assessing the strength of a
plaintiff's statistical case of disparate impact, see G. LANouz & B. LEE, supra note 73, at
165-66.
95. Courts have been alert to employment qualifications or rules that explicitly or im-
plicitly embody stereotypes. See generally Taub, supra note 88.
96. R. KANTER, supra note 83, at 54 (a correlation between the degree of ambiguity in a
position and the selection of incumbents on the basis of social similarity is to be'expected).
1991]
Vermont Law Review
as a merit-uncertainty stereotype, causes women's accomplish-
ments to be attributed to luck rather than ability. Women are al-
ways, in a sense, on probation. 7 Evaluators may tolerate relatively
weak evidence to support, and require almost incontrovertible evi-
dence to dispel, preconceptions that make the merit of an individ-
ual woman's accomplishments presumptively more uncertain than
similar accomplishments of men.98
The disadvantages of this procedural stereotype are exacer-
bated by methodological deficiencies in merit reviews. For exam-
ple, information gaps necessarily undermine the certainty of indi-
vidual merit. Professor Bok calls adjustments in the degree of
certainty in the evaluation of merit "manipulations of certainty."99
They can occur either through carelessness or through intentional
misconduct, and can make an assessment of merit either falsely
certain or falsely uncertain. For example, less than comprehensive
or less than accurate information gathered through informal means
and heavily infused by opinion can strengthen an evaluator's stere-
otyped and presumptive lack of confidence in women's merit.
Worse, the methodological deficiencies of academic reviews put
women at the mercy of individual evaluators who wish to construct
career barriers for women by intentionally undermining certainty.
Consider what may happen when but a single evaluator in a
group review intentionally seeks to lessen the chances that a wo-
man will be favorably reviewed. Perhaps during pre-vote discus-
sions of merit, the evaluator interjects a negative opinion on a crit-
ical issue. Even if the opinion is not based on facts that can be
substantiated, the unfavorable assertion of opinion will: (1) require
a response, diverting attention from discussion of other matters,
and clouding the discussion of merit from that point forward; (2)
raise questions that may linger in the memory of other evaluators
97. Rhode, supra note 79, at 1187-92; see also B. SANDLER, supra note 92.
98. Although it occurred outside a formal review process, Professor Derek Bell's experi-
ence at Stanford is a good illustration of how benefits of the doubt and standards of cer-
tainty may combine with preconceptions about race or gender to the disadvantage of indi-
viduals. Some students, dissatisfied with Professor Bell's course in constitutional law,
complained to other faculty. Instead of openly investigating the validity of the complaints or
attributing student dissatisfaction to student deficiencies (certainly the more common peer
reaction to student complaints about a colleague's class), Stanford faculty agreed to give
students supplementary lectures in constitutional law. These arrangements were not dis-
cussed with or known to Professor Bell. See An Insult to a Law Professor, The Washington
Post, Aug. 4, 1986, sec. C, at 3.
99. S. BOK, LYING, supra note 68, at 16 and 21.
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despite refutation;100 or, given the informality of data gathering in
merit reviews, (3) not be susceptible to refutation prior to a group
vote because of a dearth of information bearing on the validity of
the opinion. Even a strong professional record can be rendered less
certain of merit by intentional manipulations of certainty that take
advantage of the methodological deficiencies in academic reviews.
Thus, in a merit review, a woman is especially dependent on
complete and accurate information to fill in information gaps for
two reasons. She needs information to counter the procedural in-
fluence of the merit-uncertainty stereotype. She is also dependent
on complete and accurate information to counter intentional ma-
nipulations of certainty by those evaluators who let impermissible
motives affect their judgment.101
Unfortunately, the usual and predominant method of gather-
ing information in academic reviews does little to respond to these
critical needs of women. Informality in a merit review-the ab-
sence of rigorous methodologies associated with truthful-
ness-gives no assurance that there is "truth" in an ultimate judg-
ment of merit. This is potentially a problem for all faculty.
However, the problem is demonstrably greater and creates more
disadvantages for women. Even if an employer uses equally undis-
ciplined evaluation methodologies for men, which I believe to be
the typical situation, women will be relatively disadvantaged. For
women, shifting and vague criteria will lead evaluators to rely upon
opinion infused with negative stereotypes rather than factual infor-
mation as the basis for review. Further, gaps in information will be
filled with conscious or unconscious stereotypes. These negative
substantive stereotypes will operate in conjunction with the dis-
advantaging merit-uncertainty stereotype-and also, occasionally,
in conjunction with illegitimate motivations-to alter (and under-
mine) degrees of confidence in a woman's individual merit. Uncer-
tain and shifting criteria and the predominance of informal rather
than formal processes for gathering information and formulating
judgments over time create a decision-making environment in
which conscious and unconscious stereotypes-procedural and sub-
stantive-will flourish.
100. Professor Bok uses the familiar example of Othello to illustrate this point. S. BOK,
LYING, supra note 68, at 19.
101. Impermissible motives may be especially likely to surface in reviews of women in
fields or departments dominated by men. B. SANDLER, supra note 92, at 16-17.
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IV. TRUTHFULNESS AND LEGAL DEFINITIONS
OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
When women are reviewed by persons utilizing methodologies
that disregard truthfulness, their opportunity to establish the
merit of their accomplishments and abilities is significantly com-
promised. This disadvantage in opportunity is a critical form of
discrimination in merit reviews. It may ultimately lead to discrimi-
natory outcomes, but outcomes are a derivative matter. Discrimi-
nation has its genesis in the deprivation of opportunity to establish
merit that inevitably flows from a disregard for truthfulness.
In general, legal concepts of discrimination underestimate
both the importance of truthfulness to merit-based personnel sys-
tems and the vital link between truthfulness and workplace dis-
crimination. 02 Because principles of truthfulness are neglected in
constructing paradigms of discrimination, contemporary forms of
discrimination are overlooked or immunized from challenge. In ad-
dition, non-discrimination mandates fail to exploit the moral imag-
ination of persons whose decisions directly affect women and mi-
norities in the workplace.
In the remainder of this article, I consider whether it is possi-
ble for the Title VII concept of discrimination to exploit the moral
imagination. By focusing on the link between truthfulness and dis-
crimination, we can reshape Title VII jurisprudence so that it be-
comes a more effective prohibition on workplace discrimination. I
draw upon Title VII jurisprudence for my examples, but the same
arguments might also apply to other non-discrimination mandates.
A. Conventional Title VII Non-discrimination Mandates
Judicial interpretations of Title VII decisively condemn the
102. I believe that is why it has proven difficult for courts to address allegations of
discrimination in merit reviews. For example, an overwhelming majority of academics be-
lieve that women have been discriminated against in academic life. Auerbach, The Silent
Opposition of Professors and Graduate Students to Preferential Affirmative Action Pro-
grams: 1969 and 1975, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1233, 1258-59 (1988). However, the record of judi-
cial decisions shows that allegations of discrimination in academia are infrequently proved.
See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 67, at 959-78. According to one study, there were more than
300 federal court decisions in academic discrimination cases between 1972 and 1984, of
which about one-half were decided on procedural grounds and one-half on the merits. Of
those decisions reaching the merits, thirty-four favored plaintiffs, six were split decisions,
and the rest were decided in favor of defendants. G. LANOUE & B. LEE, supra note 73, at 26-
31 (statistics include all class-based discrimination).
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use of discriminatory merit criteria that disadvantage women in ul-
timate judgments of merit. They do not clearly condemn discrimi-
natory practices which are facially neutral when such practices af-
fect opportunity rather than outcome. An examination of the facts
underlying two recent Supreme Court decisions involving stereo-
types helps one to understand the differences between these two
types of discrimination claims.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,103 the defendant used a com-
plex group process to review the merit of candidates for partner-
ship. The partner responsible for explaining the outcome of merit
reviews told Ann Hopkins that a decision on her partnership was
postponed, and that if she wanted to become a partner, she should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femi-
ninely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.
10 4
Other partners indicated that Hopkins was sometimes too "aggres-
sive" or "macho" or that, as a lady, she should not use "foul lan-
guage."105 Hopkins apparently did not dispute the accuracy of
these descriptions; rather, she objected to the fact that women
partners were expected to behave according to different standards
than those applied to men. Her discrimination claim challenged
the criteria her employer used to define merit, and the criteria
against which the "truth" of her merit was judged.
In Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust,10 6 the defendant re-
peatedly denied promotion to Clara Watson, a Black woman, based
upon both the subjective judgments of supervisors acquainted with
Watson, and the requirements of the positions to which she wished
to be promoted. Watson was told, among other things, that one of
the positions involved handling a lot of money, and that persons of
her race could not perform that task.107 In objecting to the sugges-
tion that she could not competently deal with large sums of money,
Watson did not challenge the criterion of qualification itself.
Rather, she questioned the method used to determine whether she
met the relevant and legitimate job qualification of competence to
handle large sums of money. She challenged the employer's use of
a stereotype as a substitute for inquiry into her individual merit.
103. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
104. Id. at 235.
105. Id.
106. 487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988).
107. Id. at 990.
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The facts in Watson state an obvious claim of a denial of op-
portunity to establish merit, but the plaintiff did not structure her
case to make such a claim. In contrast, the plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse did argue that the Court should look at the practical
impacts of the use of stereotypes on the process by which merit
was assessed, but the Court did not orient its primary analysis to
this argument.108 The constraints of conventional disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact analyses (or litigation strategies reflect-
ing the assumptions of those analyses) apparently ensured in both
cases that the validity of the final determination of merit, i.e., out-
come rather than opportunity and process, would be the focal
point of both decisions. 09
In general, conventional disparate treatment analysis requires
a plaintiff to show that a defendant's discriminatory motive caused
an adverse outcome.110 It is structured to enable a court to identify
the reason for a final employment decision. In the typical case in
which there is no direct evidence of a discriminatory motive, the
plaintiff's qualifications and the outcome of decisions affecting
comparable persons will be examined to determine whether the de-
fendant's explanation for an adverse judgment of merit was justi-
fied. In other words, as a practical matter, conventional disparate
treatment analysis tends to focus on qualifications and ultimate
judgments of merit.
Some Justices believe that proven racism or sexism must be
causally related to an adverse outcome because of the types of
remedies available through Title VII.111 Others appear to recognize
that discriminatory comments can have negative effects, even in
108. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 and Watson, 487 U.S. at 982-83; see
also infra note 114.
109. In fact, Price Waterhouse in many ways solidifies the outcome focus of conven-
tional disparate treatment analysis. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. Similarly, Wat-
son reinforces the outcome focus of conventional disparate impact analysis. See Watson, 487
U.S. at 999-1000.
110. See M. PLAYER, supra note 79, at 327.
111. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J., distinguishing be-
tween damages and injunctive relief); see also M. PLAYER, supra note 79, at 327-28. Player
apparently considers stereotypes as evidence only of illegal motivation that must be causally
linked to an adverse outcome in order to give rise to a valid Title VII claim. "If the defend-
ant is able to convince the fact-finder that the same decision would have been made even
absent the illegal motivation, there has been no remediable violation of the Act." Id. at 328.
The focus on motivation and outcome, rather than on process and opportunity, is accompa-
nied by a distinction between what are called "technical" and "remediable" violations of
Title VII. See id. at 328 n.17. Unless an adverse outcome is actually caused by the discrimi-
natory motive, there is no Title VII remedy.
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the context of a predominantly favorable review,112 and that Title
VII protects against more than adverse outcomes causally related
to the use of discriminatory criteria."' When a plaintiff's claim is
framed to focus on outcome, however, outcome will necessarily be
the analytical focus,"" and a causal connection between motive
and outcome will be difficult to prove." 5 If, for example, discrimi-
natory comments like those made by the Price Waterhouse part-
ners are construed as views of only one or two of many evaluators,
or as only inadvertent lapses insignificant in light of many other
valid reasons considered in good faith during the review, an ad-
verse outcome is not "because of" discrimination and no Title VII
liability arises. 16
112. 490 U.S. at 257-58 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
113. Id. at 250.
114. The Supreme Court might have addressed a process claim had the plaintiff in
Price Waterhouse raised that challenge to an alleged biased decision-making process at the
early stages of litigation. Because she only addressed that argument to Supreme Court, it
was not discussed in the opinion. Id. at 240 n.5.
115. It is difficult to establish a discriminatory motive for an adverse outcome in many
merit reviews. Explicit sexism, like that revealed through the careless candor of the Price
Waterhouse partner, is rare. Liability-conscious employers take pains to avoid such overt
comments or explanations for their decisions. Conventional disparate treatment analysis
permits a plaintiff to generate an inference of discriminatory motive by showing that an
employer made a different and favorable decision regarding a comparable male. But in
many merit reviews--especially those for upper-level or professional jobs-a plaintiff will
find it exceedingly difficult to generate a circumstantial case based on different treatment of
a comparable person. Comparability is not a feature associated with the types of jobs that
exist, or the types of evaluations that occur, in a professional setting or at upper levels of
management. Professional and upper level positions are sufficiently flexible in their respon-
sibilities to accommodate unique qualifications of many different candidates. Moreover,
openings in or decisions respecting these positions may occur infrequently. The passage of
time and changes in the workplace will inevitably alter requirements for those positions.
Comparability is elusive, if not chimerical, under these circumstances. See, e.g., G. LANouE
& B. LEE, supra note 73. In the example offered by LaNoue and Lee, the court felt that the
value of comparative evidence was so slight that the time needed to establish comparability
warranted exclusion of the evidence. Id. at 69. The plaintiff compared himself to four other
faculty, only one of which was in his department. The judge found that there was insuffi-
* cient comparability given the terms of employment of the plaintiff and his department col-
league. As for the other three faculty, the judge attributed differences in treatment to differ-
ent department rules and stated that there was no discrimination in decentralized decision-
making of this sort. Id. at 124-25. See also, Bartholet, supra note 67, at 1001 (disparate
treatment analysis presumes a predictable system against which an aberrational decision
will stand out as discriminatory).
116. See, e.g., Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. at 990 (seven Justices seem
to agree that proof of racist remarks regarding the competence of African-Americans in
money matters might not be sufficient to establish a Title VII claim under a conventional
disparate treatment analysis); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251 (Bren-
nan, J., plurality opinion). Moreover, in many cases unconscious stereotypes and prejudices
contaminate the merit-review process. Such contaminants are not reached by disparate
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Conventional disparate impact analysis is even less suited to
claims of discrimination in opportunity and process. It is unclear
whether the Court does not appreciate the possibility that a dispa-
rate impact claim could be stated in terms of process and opportu-
nity,1 17 or whether plaintiffs simply have not yet structured such a
claim. If the analytical standards utilized in Wards Cove' "s are ap-
plied to facially neutral evaluation processes that utilize subjective
criteria, however, a plaintiff would be required to link adverse out-
comes to a specific employment practice, using statistics that show
that the particular practice has caused the adverse outcome "be-
cause of race [or sex]. '""9 The lack of comparability of many per-
sonnel decisions will make it difficult if not impossible to establish
a statistically significant showing that an adverse group outcome
was caused by a particular impermissible discriminatory
practice. 120
treatment analysis. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990, Disparate treatment analysis is evolving, com-
pare Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and is not necessarily inapplicable to discrimi-
nation resulting from unconscious prejudice. See, e.g., Hebert, Redefining the Burdens of
Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards Cove and
the Civil Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C.L. REV. 1, 87 n.286 (1990).
117. Justices frequently use the terms "criteria", "judgments", and "practices" inter-
changeably, to refer to the same discrimination claims. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 977.
118. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
119. Four Justices adopted this standard in Watson, 487 U.S. at 993-95 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ.).
120. See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 996-97 (O'Connor, J., alternative holding); see also
Bartholet, supra note 67, at 998-99 (discussing the difficulty of using traditional statistical
methods in disparate impact analysis). The Court invalidated one component of an evalua-
tion process because its adverse impact precluded individuals from an opportunity to com-
pete in later stages of an evaluation. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). The language
of the majority opinion supports application of disparate impact theory to process-opportu-
nity claims. Id. at 448-51. However, Justice Powell's opinion described circumstances that
he argued would enable an employer to avoid Title VII liability. Id. at 463-64. According to
Powell, a weakness in the majority opinion is that it could be used to defeat disparate im-
pact liability if an employer utilizes a multifaceted evaluation, rather than particular merit
criteria, in a sequential screening process. Id. at 463-64 n.8; compare Watson, 487 U.S. at
994 (O'Connor, J., citing Teal opinion with approval) and id. at 487 n.10 (Blackmun, J.,
explicitly questioning the wisdom of that analysis).
If there are sufficient numbers of decisions available to justify a valid statistical analy-
sis, statistical proof of disparate impact in outcome may have special relevance to denials of
equal opportunity in some types of cases. For some time, Title VII analysis embodied an
assumption that "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that non-discriminatory
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the popula-
tion in the community from which employees are hired." International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 341 n.20 (1977). In recent cases, the Supreme Court has come
to question the Teamsters' assumption and the forms of statistical proof derived from it.
Justice O'Connor has stated "[it is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimi-
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The current outcome focus of disparate impact and disparate
treatment analysis is unsuited to claims of discriminatory denials
of opportunity to establish merit. If it is to be an effective non-
discrimination mandate, Title VII should be interpreted to reflect
the fact that discrimination in merit evaluations arises not only
because substantive criteria are sexist or racist, and therefore lead
to discriminatory final judgments of merit, but also because review
methodologies violate principles of truthfulness in ways that ad-
versely affect the opportunity of women and minorities to demon-
strate merit.121
As a theoretical matter, Title VII clearly applies to employ-
ment opportunity and to discriminatory practices and methodolo-
gies. 2 ' When employers adopt merit-based personnel systems pre-
mised on a commitment to truthfulness,'23 Title VII should protect
opportunity within those systems. If an employer disregards the
principle of truthfulness in a merit evaluation, he denies the indi-
vidual who is being evaluated an opportunity to establish the merit
nation is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in accordance
with the laws of chance." Watson; 487 U.S. at 992.
Although O'Connor's disagreement with the Teamsters' proposition may carry weight
when one is assessing the discriminatory impact of hiring decisions made from a pool of
applicants having no necessary claim to qualification, it is less persuasive in post-hire per-
sonnel decisions. The pool of persons affected by post-hire decisions is not a random pool. It
has been pre-screened for qualifications by the employer. It is entirely reasonable, therefore,
for a court to assume that groups treated equally in opportunity and evaluations will have
statistically comparable outcomes. Thus, statistics related to outcome may have special rele-
vance to alleged discrimination in post-hire evaluations. See also G. LANouE AND B. LEE,
supra note 73, at 73-74.
121. In conventional doctrinal terms, one might think of a failure of truthfulness either
as having disparate impact or as evidence that an otherwise legitimate justification for an
employment decision is a mere pretext for discrimination. In the latter case, in violating
principles of truthfulness, review methodologies compromise an employer's claim to "truth"
in a given ultimate judgment of merit. Moreover, they compromise attempts to establish
that an ultimate judgment is "untrue," which places an aggrieved employee in a most diffi-
cult situation if she attempts to utilize internal grievance or appeal procedures to alter an
initially adverse judgment. See infra notes 128, 130, 141 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (eligibility to be consid-
ered for partnership is protected by Title VII if the employer chooses to confer this privilege
on other similarly situated employees); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); cf.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (prohibition on discrimination in apprentice and training programs).
123. Although Title VII does not require employers to adopt merit-based personnel sys-
tems, eliminating gender and race as legal decision-making factors has encouraged merit-
based decision-making. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse 490 U.S. at 244 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 74-75 n.6 (1984); Texas Dep. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981). "The .. .purpose of Title VII is to promote
hiring on the basis of job qualifications rather than on the basis of race." 110 Cong. Rec.
7247 (1964).
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of credentials, accomplishments, and abilities. The critical question
in Title VII analysis is whether a particular disregard of truthful-
ness is necessarily a denial of equal opportunity based on race or
sex. I believe that it is, and that a strong definition of Title VII
discrimination should recognize that fact.
B. Proposed Title VII Analysis for Denials of
Opportunity in Merit Reviews
The principle of equal opportunity embodies two different no-
tions of equality. One is absolute and presumptive, the other fac-
tual and contextual.
1 2 4
The absolute and presumptive view of equality inheres in the
word "opportunity." Opportunity is an important individual right
because it is predicated on, and affirms, the potential worth and
abilities of each and every one of us, regardless of gender or race. A
guarantee of opportunity protects one's right to prove oneself, a
right to have a crack at something, a right to establish one's cre-
dentials. In the absence of an underlying presumption of potential
equal worth of each individual, there would be no reason to protect
individual opportunity. If individuals are branded by gender or ra-
cial grouping, and are not presumed to have potential equal indi-
vidual worth, there is no reason to protect their opportunity: we
know, by definition, that members of those groups cannot prove
themselves even if given the chance. Thus, a denial of opportunity,
represented by a failure of truthfulness, compromises the pre-
sumed potential equal worth and abilities of each individual.
1 2 5
The phrase "equal opportunity" also embodies a factual and
contextual concept of equality. It literally seems to demand only
that all persons be treated strictly alike. But Title VII has applied
the phrase in a more expansive way. Even literally equal treatment.
can be discriminatory under Title VII, as disparate impact analysis
124. Cf. Ronald Dworkin's discussion of the twin notions of equality. R. DWORKIN, TAK-
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977) (a right to treatment as an equal, and a right to equal
treatment).
125. Although some would remind us that the notion of equality of individuals
originated with the notion of equal moral potentialities, E. PAGELS, supra note 50, at 51-52,
and even coexisted with strong beliefs in inherent inequalities in physical and mental capac-
ities, G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 207-28
(1979), the notion has become secularized and expanded in its applicability. Contemporary
thought does not typically differentiate between spheres of presumed equality. See, e.g.,
Fallon, supra note 67, at 815 n.3, 836-37.
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tells us. 126 If practices are functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination, they may violate Title VII's equality standard.
1 2 7
Both notions of equality are important to meaningful Title
VII analysis of denial of opportunity in merit reviews. The first
notion draws attention to the individual claiming Title VII protec-
tion, and reminds us of the significance of what is at stake for
women and minorities in a denial of opportunity. It is particularly
significant to a legal analysis that draws on the strengths and pre-
dispositions of the moral imagination. The second notion reminds
us that the "equality"-the even-handedness-of an employer's
practices cannot be assessed in factually simplistic ways.
I propose a Title VII definition of discrimination in opportu-
nity. This definition incorporates the two notions of equality, and
exploits the link between disregard for truthfulness and workplace
discrimination. The definition includes a presumption of discrimi-
nation against women and minorities because a failure of truthful-
ness in a merit review operates to their special disadvantage and
necessarily precludes any meaningful inquiry into the legitimacy of
merit-based justifications for a particular decision.2 8 It asserts that
discrimination in opportunity occurs whenever an employer fails to
adhere to a practice of truthfulness in a woman's or a minority's
merit evaluation. 12  For purposes of the definition, a practice of
truthfulness consists of a methodology for reaching an ultimate
judgment of merit that can claim to be true.
126. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (even a facially neu-
tral policy, applied equally to all, may be invalid under Title VII if it has a disparate impact
on women or minorities); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 394-96 (1986) (even a facially
neutral policy is invalid under Title VII if it operates to freeze a discriminatory status quo).
127. Watson, 487 U.S. 987.
128. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Although some argue that discrimina-
tion occurs because employers apply exceptionally rigorous merit standards in reviews of
women and minorities, their argument does not differentiate between forms of objectionable
conduct in merit reviews. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 70, at 2406 (quoting from a letter by
Robert Paul Wolff). An employer's conclusion that a woman is not meritorious, when com-
pared to other favorable decisions respecting the merit of apparently similar male employ-
ees, may be characterized as more rigorous, but the methodology that led to that conclusion
is usually anything but rigorous. Informal methodologies simply inure to the benefit of men
and the disadvantage of women. See, e.g., Cannings & Montmarquette, Managerial Momen-
tum: A Simultaneous Model of the Career Progress of Male and Female Managers, 44
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 212 (1991).
129. I am indebted to Professor Sissela Bok's discussion of practices of "deception" and
"deceit" which helped to clarify my notion of practices of truthfulness. See S. BOK, LYING,
supra note 68, at 64. Of course, I assume full responsibility for the specific definition of
practices of truthfulness used in this paper and for applications of the definition to
discrimination.
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Outcomes of subjective merit reviews may be difficult to sec-
ond-guess, and rationales for decisions about merit difficult to
pinpoint, but the character of a review-whether it qualifies as a
practice of truthfulness-is more objectively ascertainable. 130 This
is not to say there is a litmus test. A number of formal evaluative
methodologies might qualify as a practice of truthfulness. Actions
which are repeated, and impart pattern, consistency, and shape to
informal evaluations might also qualify.
To qualify as a practice of truthfulness, a given evaluation
must manifest integrity in the most important methodological fea-
tures of truthfulness, the features that ensure impartiality and that
parallel the moral imagination's requirements of self-scrutiny and
self-transcendence."' More subjectively, a practice of truthfulness
must create the conditions under which engagement will occur. Al-
though the qualities of self-scrutiny, self-transcendence, and en-
gagement cannot be measured quantitatively or according to an
absolute formula, they must inform an assessment of the more ob-
jectively ascertainable methodological features of a practice of
truthfulness.1 32 For example, tolerance for methodological sloppi-
ness may indicate that an employer is not truly concerned with
merit, but with some other, perhaps illegal, criterion. Tolerance for
sloppiness may also indicate that an employer's mind is already
130. If the use of discriminatory criteria is not obvious, and must be inferred from dif-
ferent ultimate judgments of merit for particular men and women, it is not surprising that
judges proceed with some caution in a Title VII dispute. Courts hesitate to second-guess the
validity of an ultimate judgment of merit. See supra note 102 (articles discussing the history
of judicial response to legal challenges to academic reviews). Deference to subjective systems
is sometimes accepted as proper. See, e.g., M. PLAYER, supra note 79, at 369, 379, 381; Fal-
lon, supra note 67, at 856. Player notes that some vague conclusions could be reduced to
more precise and objective elements, but he generally accepts deference. M. PLAYER, supra
at 336, 379; contra Bartholet, supra note 67, at 959-78. All writers, including Bartholet, tie
deference to subjectivity in criteria or outcomes. No writer considers, in depth, the issue of
deference to methodologies for ascertaining the truth of merit. Compare Kluger, supra note
73 (questioning the rationale for judicial deference to universities that use vague processes
and criteria).
131. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
132. Although I do not attempt to provide a checklist of objective features of a practice
of truthfulness, minimal methodological integrity might include an absence of sloppiness or
carelessness in at least the following areas: (1) specificity of criteria for determining rele-
vance, and inclusion or exclusion of information; (2) judgments of merit (either ultimate or
preliminary) that are supported by facts truly stated; (3) accuracy in the statement of dis-
crete facts; (4) processes that assure accuracy of information; (5) an ultimate judgment that
takes into account the entire domain of merit designated by the employer's selection crite-
ria; and, (6) prior, rather than ad hoc, consideration of the issue of certainty as it bears on
truth, and prior agreement on criteria for resolving uncertainties respecting individual
qualifications.
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made up, and that the evaluation is simply being used to rational-
ize, or lend legitimacy to, a prior determination. s In either event,
sloppiness indicates that an employer is not evaluating individual
merit actively and impartially, i.e., through self-scrutiny, self-tran-
scendence, and with engagement.
The model for a practice of truthfulness is not a due process
model. It imposes no requirement of adversarial, procedural fair-
ness. It imposes no prohibition on the use of anonymous or confi-
dential materials. It embodies no requirement that an employee be
permitted to participate directly in an evaluation. These proce-
dural features may indicate whether a particular evaluation em-
bodied a practice of truthfulness, but they are not determinative of
that question. For example, confidential materials and anonymous
peer reviews are characteristic of some merit evaluations. As Pro-
fessor Bok notes,1 84 one may argue that confidentiality enhances
the possibility for untruthfulness by removing accountability and a
reviewer's need to justify his opinion to others s1 3  eliminating the
possibility of reaction and feedback, permitting people to become
"mired down in stereotyped, unexamined ... ways of thinking,"' 6
and sanctioning a differentiation between insider and outsider that
is at the heart of secrecy, and entails special perils for women and
minorities.3-7 She also notes, however, that secrecy may enhance
truthfulness because it encourages evaluators to be candid. 33
Thus, although a due process model of evaluation might see se-
crecy as per se impermissible, the practice of truthfulness model
does not. Secrecy is simply a factor to be considered in determin-
ing whether a particular evaluation has adhered to a practice of
truthfulness.' 9
133. S. BOK, LYING, supra note 68, at 7, 90 (some persons may tell lies or manipulate
facts because they believe that they already know the broader truth, and their action is
simply a noble lie, a pious fraud, perpetrated in a higher interest); id. at 9-10 (some persons
may indicate by their deceitful conduct that they are skeptical about whether truth can
really be known). Cf. M. MARTIN, supra note 69, at 63 (self-deception can be seen as an
"'original project' to avoid using rational standards for evidence").
134. S. BOK, SxCRrS, supra note 69, at 25-26, 109-11.
135. Id. at 106 (this is especially problematic when secrecy is practiced by those already
in power).
136. Id. at 25-26.
137. Id. at 109-10. See also, S. BOK, LYING, supra note 68, at 158.
138. S. BOK, SECRErS, supra note 69, at 18-24.
139. In my opinion, it should be a factor that requires careful scrutiny because of its
potential dangers for untruthfulness. For example, Bok notes that gossip, informal commu-
nication about individuals that has no assurances of accuracy or reliability and that is fre-
quently a vehicle for stereotypes, flourishes in an environment of secrecy. As she says,
1991]
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Whether a particular pattern or aggregation of discrete fail-
ures of truthfulness actually amounts to a larger failure in the
practice of truthfulness must be decided on a case by case basis. A
practice of truthfulness may be compromised through any combi-
nation of discrete failures of truthfulness. For example, a single
discrete failure respecting a matter critical to an evaluation may
suffice, as may a number of aggregate failures that in themselves
would be trivial. General sloppiness that gives rise to an inference
that an employer was not impartial or interested in truth might
also suffice. Since practices of truthfulness can take many forms,
an assessment of a particular evaluation will require an under-
standing of the evaluative environment. Expert testimony can help
provide this understanding, but the integrity of a merit review, as
measured against the model of a practice of truthfulness, can be
judged by non-experts. 40
To assess the significance of discrete failures of truthfulness, a
court must look to three factors. The first factor is that truthful-
ness imposes disparate burdens and consequences upon employer
and employee. For the employee, a practice of truthfulness is a pri-
mary guarantee of impartiality and of opportunity to establish in-
dividual merit. To be deprived of that opportunity is to be de-
prived of an important right, a right to be engaged with, and to be
taken seriously. Moreover, the consequences to an employee of a
process that disregards truthfulness, as well as any unjustly ad-
verse evaluation derived from the process, can be severe, long last-
ing, and difficult to fully remedy. 4" Conversely, it costs the em-
"[g]ossip increases whenever information is both scarce and desireable." S. BOK, SEcMrrs,
supra note 69, at 91, 95, 100.
140. Expert testimony might also be used to review the replicability of the ultimate
judgment, based on facts and subsidiary judgments known to the evaluator at the time the
judgment was made. The expert is not presenting evidence for the purpose of enabling a
court to second-guess the decision-maker. Rather, the expert's evidence provides one clue
regarding the completeness and certainty of the judgments generated by the employer's
evaluative process. This issue bears on whether the employer's process qualifies as a practice
of truthfulness. Compare the discussion of similar evidence in Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the relevant causation inquiry is whether
the same outcome would have been reached on the basis of the facts before the evaluator at
the time the decision was made).
141. Consider the difficulty of providing full relief to an individual through a new re-
view. A new review that is performed by the same employer who disregarded truthfulness in
the first place, and that is inevitably tainted by whatever substantive matters and opinions
were introduced in the first review, can hardly provide a fully effective remedy. In some
instances, this reality may cause a court to award the job or promotion that has been denied
due to discriminatory conduct, but this course of judicial action is relatively rare. See, e.g.,
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, No. 90-7099 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 1990); Brown v. Trustees of
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ployer little to provide a full opportunity to each employee to
establish merit and to be taken seriously. Adherence to a practice
of truthfulness does not bind an employer to a particular disposi-
tion or ultimate judgment, either in favor of or adverse to any em-
ployee. The disparity in burdens and consequences should inform
the determination of what constitutes a failure in the practice of
truthfulness.
The second factor is that of wrongfulness. An employer who
fails to adhere to a practice of truthfulness is a wrongdoer in a
number of conventional senses. An employer's failure to adhere to
the dictates of truthfulness can have profound and direct effects on
the character of an employee's personal and professional relation-
ships, and interferes with personal autonomy, choice, and expecta-
tions. 142 These consequences are similar to consequences viewed
sufficiently wrongful, in and of themselves, to impose tort liability
through, for example, actions for defamation.
14
Moreover, in the absence of explanation, a failure to adhere to
a practice of truthfulness in the evaluation of a woman or minority
is wrongful in the same way that careless conduct in light of fore-
seeable consequences is wrongful. In some instances, a failure to
adhere to a practice of truthfulness may be so blatant a disregard
of probable consequences that it should even be equated with con-
scious discrimination. A failure to adhere to a practice of truthful-
ness may have both a temporal and patterned dimension (i.e., a
repeated disregard for truthfulness) that simply does not comport
with what we know will be the behavior of an impartial evaluator,
an evaluator who assumes the potential worth of all persons. Given
Boston University, 891 F.2d 337, 359-61 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990) (award-
ing job upon finding of discrimination by employer).
142. Bok endorses the notion that deception "leads lives astray." See S. BOK, LYING,
supra note 68, at 20, 22-23; WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 46, at 134-35. An em-
ployee who is led to believe that her job performance will influence an employer's evaluation
of merit believes that she has some control over the course of her career through the choices
she makes as an employee. Her autonomy of choice is destroyed if truthfulness is not ad-
hered to in a merit evaluation. When expectations upon which prior choices have been
based are invalid, an employee will experience an assault on personal autonomy and the
integrity of personal choice. Lack of truthfulness in merit evaluations may falsify, retrospec-
tively, an entire professional life.
143. The severity of the wrongfulness of lying is attested to in a compelling story told
by Irina Ratushinskaya. A prisoner of the Soviet Gulag, asked to identify the worst depriva-
tion she suffered, identified the lies told by those in authority. These lies caused the prison-
ers to experience the world as essentially irrational, an extremely harsh consequence for
thinking persons. I. RATUSHINSKAYA, GREv IS THE COLOR OF HOPE 156-62 (1988).
1991]
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what is known about the gender-disadvantaging aspects of infor-
mal review processes, a sufficient degree of what might otherwise
appear only to be carelessness may compel one to infer what
Niebuhr called "interested intelligence" ' or, in other words, bad
motive. The pattern and consistency that characterize a failure to
adhere to a practice of truthfulness make it highly unlikely that
the nature of the practice has escaped the employer's conscious no-
tice. These conventional notions of wrongdoing should affect how
one assesses failures in the practice of truthfulness.
4 5
The third factor is the guarantee of opportunity. A practice of
truthfulness guarantees opportunity. This is an important princi-
ple because it is predicated on an affirmation of the potential
worth of each individual. Failure to adhere to a practice of truth-
fulness compromises a fundamental principle of egalitarianism, one
worthy of the strictest protection. In fact, of all principles associ-
ated with non-discrimination mandates, opportunity is the one
principle to which most individuals have an unequivocal commit-
ment." " The generally acknowledged significance of the right at
stake should affect how one assesses discrete failures in the prac-
tice of truthfulness.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing argument suggests, a new way of looking at
workplace discrimination emerges from the moral imagination. It
can enrich existing legal constructs,' 4 and suggest new definitions
144. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 8, at 215. See also, THE BOOK OF THE SELF: PERSON, PRE-
TEXT, AND PROCESS 27 (P. Young-Eisendrath & J. Hall eds. 1987) (one discovers how to
evaluate motive by looking at actions and reactions, at the give and take that occurs be-
tween individuals over time); S. BOK, LYING, supra note 68. As Bok says, it is easy to tell one
lie, and hard to tell only one. To be effective, a lie must be part of a construct that has
internal consistency. If a lie does not fit with other information, it will be difficult to main-
tain. For that reason, one lie tends to generate supporting lies. See id. at 26, 64.
145. One might forcefully argue that failure of a practice of truthfulness provides a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination under disparate treatment analysis. However,
in addition to the traditional concerns over outcomes and criteria, one must slightly reorient
the analysis to take into account processes and practices.
146. This commitment is expressed by lay persons and theorists. See Auerbach, supra
note 102, at 1265; see generally J. RAwLs, supra note 55.
147. For example, it may encourage courts to take full advantage of the remedial pur-
poses of Title VII to respond to denials of opportunity, and to reassess conventional distinc-
tions between "technical" and "remediable" violations of Title VII. Restricted applications
of "make whole" equitable remedies are not responsive to Title VII's substantive proscrip-
tions regarding opportunity. Cf. Bibbs. v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc). In addition, understanding the link between truthfulness and discrimination may
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of discrimination that may practically affect the lives of women
and minorities. In the workplace, for example, it may help employ-
ers address subtle forms of discrimination. It may encourage em-
ployers to acknowledge that egalitarianism is not opposed to, but is
perfectly consistent with, and even implicit in, the merit-based
personnel systems that are predominant in workplace evaluations.
It will make it difficult for decision-makers to avoid self-scrutiny,
self-transcendence, and engagement.
The moral imagination does not, of course, remedy all non-
discrimination doctrinal difficulties. Predictably, it even creates
new analytical complexities. For example, if truthfulness is to in-
fluence interpretations of Title VII, it is clear that causation stan-
dards must be adapted to new definitions of discrimination that
focus on opportunity.148 The relationship between liability and
remedy must be carefully considered in the context of denials of
opportunity.149 Burdens of proof must be appropriately allo-
cated.1 560 A concept of discrimination that focuses on practices of
truthfulness must be fine-tuned through an analytical framework
sensitive to different work environments and different conse-
quences for various racial and gender groups in those
environments.1
51
Despite the complexity of these issues, the moral imagination
should be brought to bear, in a sustained way, on definitions of
workplace discrimination. The individuals who bear the burdens of
specific acts of discrimination, and who are deprived of an oppor-
tunity to compete on an even playing field, deserve the effort. They
deserve the right to conditions that will compel a decision-maker's
engagement with them. They deserve non-discrimination doctrines
that enable them to challenge decisions at the level of individual
help courts draw a distinction between discrimination suits that ask for second-guessing the
ultimate judgment of merit, and suits asking only that judgments be supported by facts
truly stated. Additionally, it may assist courts in identifying criteria or aspects of process
that need special attention because they are particularly susceptible to unequal application.
Finally, it may affect the evaluation of evidence of discrimination, and what inferences
about questionable decisions will be drawn from evidence of an employer's attitudes toward
truthfulness or from discrete instances of untruthfulness.
148. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1989) (Brennan, J.).
149. Id. at 242-45 n.10.
150. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270-79 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
151. The Supreme Court has stated that its conventional analytical frameworks should
not be automatically applied to all forms of alleged discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-76 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 358 (1977); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
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decision-making."' They deserve a definition of discrimination
that commands the moral attention of others because it incorpo-
rates fundamental notions of right and wrong.
In Parting the Waters,13 Taylor Branch describes the influ-
ence of Reinhold Niebuhr and, in particular, Niebuhr's Moral Man
and Immoral Society," on the civil rights strategies adopted by
the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. " ' Niebuhr was concerned
with political strategies intended to secure "an ethical social goal
for society."'M He proposed that political strategies be measured
by two criteria: (1) whether they "[d]o justice to the moral re-
sources and possibilities in human nature and provide for the ex-
ploitation of every latent moral capacity in man," and (2) whether
they "take account of the limitations of human nature, particularly
those which manifest themselves in man's collective behavior.''5'
It is worthwhile to step back from our current debates about
the problem of discrimination, and take a look at how civil rights
laws fare when measured against the criteria that apparently influ-
enced Dr. King's political strategy. The moral imagination enables
us to embark on this task.
152. Problems of discrimination frequently become more manageable, less resistant to
solution, when they are framed and treated as problems of individual relationships rather
than as consequences of the actions of faceless institutions. Perhaps the problem of discrim-
ination has remained intractable over the years because it has not been confronted at the
level of individual, personal accountability. The methodological requirements of the moral
imagination reinforce and bring to the fore the normative demand for engagement that is
embodied in non-discrimination mandates. In that way, the moral imagination reinforces
the substantive claim of women and minorities to be treated seriously, to be engaged with
and responded to as individuals. Historically a prerogative of the powerful, R. NIEBUHR,
supra note 8, at 177, the claim is itself an assertion of power that in subtle but important
ways affects decisions. For example, those who claim a right to engagement are not required
to assume the role of supplicant. Cf. Minow, supra note 9 (the role of supplicant com-
promises an otherwise excellent argument). One may argue that the moral imagination cre-
ates opportunities for engagement among women or minorities that defeat the isolating ef-
fects of discrimination and that will empower these groups. See, e.g., K. BUMILLER, supra
note 9, at 93 (suggesting that a moral framework is necessary to overcome the powerlessness
of women victimized by discrimination); R. FOGEL, supra note 59 (discussing the way in
which slavery-and by extrapolation, discrimination-prevents the development of commu-
nity among its objects).
153. T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988).
154. See R. NIEBUHR, supra note 8.
155. T. BRANCH, supra note 153, at 83-87.
156. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 8, at xxiv.
157. Id. at xxiv-xxv.
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